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The Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause is one of the most controversial 
provisions in the Constitution. Although it appears only to guarantee fair procedures, it 
has become the Court’s primary vehicle for invalidating State laws that violate 
fundamental liberties—in the practice now known as “substantive due process.” In recent 
years, though, a line of landmark Supreme Court decisions protecting gay rights, 
authored by Justice Kennedy, have signaled a new chapter for substantive due process—
one where the Due Process Clause works in tandem with the Equal Protection Clause. I 
argue that the framework employed by Justice Kennedy in these cases differs from the 
standard substantive due process framework in important ways and constitutes an 
independent doctrine of equal dignity. 
 
This doctrine of equal dignity has major implications for the next generation of 
substantive due process cases, as it equips the Court to strike down laws that 
institutionalize subordination. In particular, the Court’s equal dignity precedents single 
out its 1997 decision in Washington v. Glucksberg, where the Court ruled that laws 
banning physician-assisted suicide were not unconstitutional. I argue, however, that the 
doctrine of equal dignity implies the existence of a “right to die with dignity.” 
Consequently, Glucksberg should be overruled—granting terminally ill patients the right 
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Few justices in the history of the Supreme Court had the opportunity to shape American 
constitutional jurisprudence to the extent that Anthony Kennedy did. From his appointment in 
1987 to his retirement in 2018, Kennedy left a bold mark on some of the Court’s most high-
profile decisions. As the swing vote in most of the Roberts Court’s 5-4 cases, Kennedy ended up 
authoring many key majority opinions. These cases ranged from Citizens United, which paved 
the way for basically unlimited campaign spending by corporations, to Obergefell v. Hodges, 
which legalized gay marriage nationwide. 
Looking back over a legacy like Kennedy’s, one could pick any number of individual 
accomplishments as the one to define his time on the Court. Arguably the most significant, 
though, was his emphasis on human dignity. Noah Feldman, the Felix Frankfurter Professor of 
Law at Harvard Law School, argues as much in his article, “Justice Kennedy’s Legacy Is the 
Dignity He Bestowed.”1 Fellow Harvard Law professor Laurence Tribe agrees—describing 
Kennedy’s “chief jurisprudential achievement” as having “tightly wound the double helix of Due 
Process and Equal Protection into a doctrine of equal dignity.”2  
This doctrine of equal dignity, though, was not born overnight. It developed slowly, 
largely from the pen of Justice Kennedy, over decades. Its inception, modest but unmistakable, 
was in the Supreme Court’s 1992 decision to uphold abortion rights in Planned Parenthood v. 
Casey. From that inconspicuous starting point, equal dignity grew in power and prominence 
 
1 Noah Feldman, Justice Kennedy’s Legacy is the Dignity He Bestowed, BLOOMBERG (June 27, 2018), 
https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2018-06-27/anthony-kennedy-retirement-his-legacy-is-dignity-he-
created. 
2 Laurence H. Tribe, Equal Dignity: Speaking Its Name, 129 HARV. L. REV. F. 16, 17 (2015). 
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through the gay rights cases: Lawrence v. Texas (2003), United States v. Windsor (2013), and 
Obergefell v. Hodges (2015).  
These cases invoked dignity with increasing frequency in varying ways. But the broad 
outlines of equal dignity became clearer and clearer. For one, equal dignity tied the previously 
separate considerations of the Due Process and Equal Protection clauses together, into what 
Tribe coined a “double helix.”3 It also accompanied (and perhaps entailed) a different type of 
substantive due process analysis—one much less strict and formulaic than the one the 
conservative members of the Court had been pushing. Obergefell, which legalized same-sex 
marriage nation-wide, articulated these aspects of equal dignity more clearly than any previous 
cases. Now that Justice Kennedy is no longer on the Supreme Court, though, the future of the 
doctrine remains up in the air. Many questions as to its scope and power are left to be answered.  
In particular, Obergefell appears to be at odds with the Court’s 1997 decision in 
Washington v. Glucksberg. In Glucksberg, the Court determined that there was no 
constitutionally protected liberty interest that would grant a terminally ill patient the right to 
physician-assisted suicide. In doing so, the Court’s conservative members articulated a standard, 
formulaic process for approaching substantive due process cases. This approach involved 
carefully defining the alleged right in question and consulting history and tradition to see 
whether there was a basis for that right to be recognized. 
The Obergefell decision, by contrast, decided to forego this formulaic approach. Justice 





much.4 While acknowledging the incompatible approaches taken by the two cases, Kennedy 
elected not to overturn Glucksberg. At the same time, he did not endorse the Glucksberg decision 
or explain how to square the two approaches. Are the two approaches—the formulaic approach 
of Glucksberg and the dignity-based approach of Obergefell—fundamentally incompatible? Or is 
there space for them to co-exist? 
This thesis will argue that the two approaches should operate in parallel. In cases that 
implicate only the Due Process Clause, the standard framework is appropriate. But in cases that 
operate at the intersection of due process and equal protection, involving liberty and equality, the 
Glucksberg methodology cannot provide an adequate remedy. The Court should turn to Justice 
Kennedy’s dignity-based approach. 
The argument will proceed in four chapters. The first chapter describes the history of Due 
Process jurisprudence before equal dignity ever made an appearance. To understand the role 
equal dignity would come to play in the revival of substantive due process, one must first 
understand why it needed reviving in the first place. The now-discredited Lochner era is the 
unavoidable backdrop to any expansion of substantive due process today. 
The second chapter charts the development of equal dignity—from its inception in Casey 
to its explicit invocation in Obergefell. Understanding what equal dignity would grow to become 
requires an understanding of its roots. These roots do not always display a logical progression—
and certainly not a premeditated one. But several common threads underlie each invocation of 
dignity. 
 
4 See Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2602 (2015) (“Glucksberg did insist that liberty under the Due 
Process Clause must be defined in a most circumscribed manner, with central reference to specific historical 
practices. Yet while that approach may have been appropriate for the asserted right there involved (physician-
assisted suicide), it is inconsistent with the approach this Court has used in discussing other fundamental rights, 
including marriage and intimacy.”) 
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The third chapter synthesizes the equal dignity cases, attempting to answer the difficult 
question: how does equal dignity operate? This analysis necessarily comes in two parts. First, 
when is equal dignity applicable? Second, when it is applicable, what does it do? I will argue that 
Justice Kennedy’s methodology in the gay rights cases should replace the standard due process 
and equal protection frameworks when a case falls at the intersection of the two clauses. 
The fourth chapter will look forward, to where equal dignity leads. It will address this 
question by imagining the Court were forced to square Obergefell and Glucksberg. Is 
Glucksberg, rightly understood, an equal dignity case? Does applying Justice Kennedy’s 
framework result in a different outcome? These are difficult questions, but their answers will 





Chapter One: The Death and Resurrection of Substantive Due Process 
The question of what the Supreme Court should do when faced with a law that seems to 
violate fundamental principles of liberty and justice—but is not in clear violation of any 
Constitutional provision—is nearly as old as the Constitution itself. Just seven years after the 
passage of the Bill of Rights, Justice Chase advocated for a broad view of the role of the Court, 
in the case of Calder v. Bull (where the Court was asked to invalidate a Connecticut legislative 
act regarding wills). Justice Chase wrote: 
There are certain vital principles in our free Republican governments, which will 
determine and over-rule an apparent and flagrant abuse of legislative power; as to 
authorize manifest injustice by positive law; or to take away that security for personal 
liberty, or private property, for the protection whereof the government was established. 
An ACT of the Legislature (for I cannot call it a law) contrary to the great first principles 
of the social compact, cannot be considered a rightful exercise of legislative authority.5 
Chase was advocating for a “natural law” approach to judicial review, whereby certain laws 
should be invalidated by the Supreme Court—not because they violated any specific 
Constitutional provision—but because they were in violation of “certain vital principles” related 
to “personal liberty” and “private property.” 
Justice Chase’s approach would not win the day. Justice Iredell’s opinion in the same 
case explicitly addressed Justice Chase’s natural law approach:  
Some speculative jurists have held that a legislative act against natural justice must, in 
itself, be void; but I cannot think that, under [a constitutional scheme allocating powers 
without explicit limitations], any Court of Justice would possess a power to declare it so. 
… In order, therefore, to guard against so great an evil, it has been the policy of the … 
people of the United States, when they framed the Federal Constitution, to define with 
precision the objects of the legislative power, and to restrain its exercise within marked 
 
5 Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. 386, 388 (1798) (opinion of Chase, J.). 
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and settled boundaries. If any act of Congress, or of the Legislature of a state, violates 
those constitutional provisions, it is unquestionably [void]. 6 
This rings true. Supreme Court justices are unelected and unrepresentative, selected for their 
capacity to interpret the law, to “call balls and strikes”7—not ascertain the will of the majority or 
divine abstract principles of natural law. After all, this is precisely what the Constitution is 
designed to do, to serve as a check on legislative power when it exceeds its prescribed 
boundaries. While judges’ opinions of what “fundamental principles” should govern may 
change—over time and person to person—the words written in the Constitution do not. 
If only it were that simple. The difficult question, it turns out, has less to do with whether 
judges should rely on natural law and more to do with how to interpret the written law. Most 
everyone can agree that the Supreme Court’s job is to interpret the Constitution, as written. This 
is an easy task when, say, enforcing the requirement that the President must “have attained to the 
age of thirty five years.”8 It becomes more difficult when enforcing a clause banning “cruel and 
unusual punishments,”9 which necessitates a level of subjectivity.10 Are judges to only ban those 
forms of punishment which were considered “cruel and unusual” in 1791? Or perhaps, a bit more 
broadly, the sorts of punishments which were considered cruel and unusual two centuries ago? 
Or, is it possible that the framers of the Constitution left the clause intentionally vague, such that 
 
6 Id. at 398-99 (opinion of Iredell, J.). 
7 Confirmation Hearing on the Nomination of John G. Roberts, Jr. to be Chief Justice of the United States: 
Hearing Before the Committee on the Judiciary United States Senate, 109th Cong. 56 (2005) (statement of John G. 
Roberts, Jr., Nominee to be Chief Justice of the United States). 
8 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1. 
9 U.S. CONST. amend. VIII. 
10 See JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 13-14 (1980) (arguing that the Cruel and Unusual 
Punishments Clause is an example of a constitutional provision that requires the interpreter to reference sources 
beyond the text of the Constitution). 
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future generations could determine what sorts of punishments were “cruel” and “unusual”? There 
is no clear answer to this question, but at least in relation to the “cruel and unusual punishment” 
clause, the outer limits are clearly marked—by the words “cruel,” “unusual,” and “punishment.” 
No one could plausibly use this clause to strike down, say, the law in Calder v. Bull regarding 
wills.  
But what about when the clause in question paints in broader brushstrokes? Such is the 
case with the Fourteenth Amendment, which was ratified in the wake of the Civil War—and 
notably guaranteed “due process” and “equal protection” under the law. In the words of John 
Hart Ely, the Fourteenth Amendment  
contains provisions that are difficult to read responsibly as anything other than quite 
broad invitations to import into the constitutional decision process considerations that 
will not be found in the language of the amendment or the debates that led up to it.11  
Indeed, over the past century, the Fourteenth Amendment has been the Court’s chosen vehicle 
for invalidating laws which do not clearly fly in the face of any other amendment.12 
Almost all the headline-grabbing Fourteenth Amendment cases have been based in one of 
two clauses: the Due Process Clause or the Equal Protection Clause. The Due Process Clause, 
however, has followed a much more tumultuous path. There are three, interlocking textual 
reasons for this winding and controversy-ridden path. 
 
11 Id. at 14. 
12 See, e.g., Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (holding that segregating schoolchildren by 
race is unconstitutional); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967) (holding that state prohibition on interracial 
marriage violated both equal protection prohibition against race discrimination and due process right to marry); Roe 
v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (holding that the right to abortion falls within the right to privacy); Bush v. Gore, 531 
U.S. 98 (2000) (holding that to comply with the Equal Protection Clause, a state must employ adequate and uniform 
standards when conducting a recount of ballots); Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015) (holding that persons 
of the same sex have a constitutional right to marry).  
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First, the Clause paints in the broadest brushstrokes possible—making it a clear candidate 
for invalidating laws that do not fall under any other constitutional provision. The Due Process 
Clause states, “[N]or shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due 
process of law.” One can imagine Justice Chase’s eyes lighting up as he reads these words. He 
had written of natural law rights to “liberty” and “property”—and now, in the Fourteenth 
Amendment, it’s all there!13 Codified into the text of the document, available to invalidate any 
state law. For laws that seem to fly in the face of fundamental concepts of liberty and justice, the 
Due Process Clause is perhaps the most explicit textual basis to overturn them.  
But a second textual reality strains against the first. The Due Process Clause, on its face, 
only requires fair procedures. After invoking life, liberty, and property, the Clause goes on to say 
that all those things can be taken by the State—so long as there is due process of law. There is no 
clear invitation in the text of the Clause for judges to review a law’s substantive merits. And yet, 
the Court has used it to do just that. Due process jurisprudence is now generally split into two 
distinct lines of cases: substantive due process and procedural due process. This has resulted in 
heavy criticism from detractors and legal scholars, most memorably by John Hart Ely, who wrote 
that “we apparently need reminding that ‘substantive due process’ is a contradiction in terms—
sort of like ‘green pastel redness.’”14 Ely’s quip aside, the first-glance self-contradiction of 
“substantive due process” is not itself a death knell. Laurence Tribe points out that the words 
immediately following “due process” are “of law”—and “there is a reasonable historical 
argument that, by 1868, a recognized meaning of the qualifying phrase ‘of law’ was 
 
13 It should be noted that the Fifth Amendment, which contains a due process clause nearly identical to that 
of the Fourteenth Amendment—but in relation to the federal government—was in the Constitution at the time of 
Calder v. Bull. But it would not have been available to Justice Chase in the case in question, since the challenged 
law was a state law.  
14 ELY, supra note 10, at 18.  
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substantive.”15 Neither textual argument is dispositive, but the face-value oddness of using a 
clause guaranteeing fair procedures to invalidate a law based on its substance is a weapon that 
can be wielded by any who seek to argue against the Clause’s use or expansion.  
A third textual concern raises the stakes of due process inquiries. There are no clear 
guideposts in the text of the Due Process Clause that would limit the scope of the Clause’s reach. 
Think back to the “cruel and unusual punishments” clause. No matter how broadly a judge 
decides to read the provision, no matter how many modern sentiments of what qualifies as 
“cruel” or “unusual” those judges decide to import—the subject, unavoidably, is punishments. In 
the Due Process Clause, by contrast, the possibilities are nearly endless. For the same reason that 
a judge eager to invalidate a state law is eager to turn to the Due Process Clause for a textual 
basis, a judge hesitant to open the door to widespread judicial activism shudders at the slippery 
slope each new expansion creates. After all, what law does not, to some extent, touch either life, 
or liberty, or property? This reality can generate fear that each further expansion of substantive 
due process is a step towards a judicial review free of any textual restraints—essentially giving 
the judiciary the power and deference that Justice Chase advocated for in the 18th century.  
The Lochner Era 
These three factors came into explosive collision for the first time in the early 20th 
century, in the series of cases now referred to under the umbrella of their poster child, Lochner v. 
New York.16 The first of this line of cases to invalidate a state law came in 1897 with Allgeyer v. 
Louisiana, where the Court overruled a state law that prohibited individuals from obtaining 
 
15 LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1333 (3d ed. 2000). 




insurance from companies that did not comply with Louisiana law.17 The Court found that the 
law violated the Fourteenth Amendment, because “it deprives the defendants of their liberty 
without due process of law.”18  
The Court’s issue with the law was purely substantive, rather than procedural, and the 
liberty they identified was a broad “liberty of contract”: 
The liberty mentioned in that amendment means not only the right of the citizen to be 
free from the mere physical restraint of his person, as by incarceration, but the term is 
deemed to embrace the right of the citizen to be free in the enjoyment of all his faculties; 
to be free to use them in lawful ways; to live and work where he will; to earn his 
livelihood by any lawful calling; to pursue any livelihood or avocation, and for that 
purpose to enter into all contracts which may be proper, necessary and essential to his 
carrying out to a successful conclusion the purposes above mentioned.19 
This paragraph demonstrates just how broadly the Due Process Clause can reach, for judges who 
believe it has a substantive component that protects against legislative violation of a particular 
strand of liberty. Here, that strain was economic liberty. 
One can also see, though, just how quickly the exercise of substantive due process can 
become subjective, and necessary analysis untethered to the text of the Constitution. For 
example, the unanimous majority opinion above, authored by Justice Peckham, claims that the 
“liberty” invoked in the Fourteenth Amendment includes a person’s right “to earn his livelihood 
by any lawful calling.”20 That is all well and good, until the Court is asked to invalidate a law 
that outlaws a certain calling—like, say, prostitution. How is the Court to determine whether a 
law violates Justice Peckham’s right? If the alleged right is to have any teeth at all, then the mere 
 
17 Allgeyer v. Louisiana, 165 U.S. 578 (1897). 
18 Id. at 589.  
19 Id. 
20 Id.  
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passage of a law outlawing a calling cannot be justification enough for its constitutionality. How 
else, though, is a Court to determine whether the law violates a man’s right “to earn his 
livelihood by any lawful calling”? The unavoidable implication is that the Court must decide 
which callings it thinks should be lawful and which should not. Worst of all, there is now no 
textual basis in the Constitution to decide such a question. This reality finalizes the Court’s 
supplanting of the legislature as the branch of government that decides which acts should be 
lawful and which acts should not, and it would characterize the Court’s infamous rulings over the 
next forty years.  
Following Allgeyer, the Court repeatedly struck down laws that violated this “liberty of 
contract.” In Lochner v. New York (1905), they struck down a law with a maximum-hours 
requirement for bakers.21 In Adair v. United States (1908)22 and Coppage v. Kansas (1915),23 the 
Court struck down laws banning “yellow dog” contracts (where agreeing not to join a union is a 
condition of employment). In Adkins v. Children’s Hospital (1923), the Court struck down laws 
prescribing a minimum wage for women.24 All of these decisions were based in the Due Process 
Clause.  
As the Court forged ahead, however, several members of the Court urged a reversal of 
course. Most notable among detractors was Oliver Wendell Holmes. In his famous Lochner 
dissent, Holmes wrote: 
 
21 Lochner, 198 U.S. 45. 
22 Adair v. United States, 208 U.S. 161 (1908), overruled by Lincoln Union v. Northwestern Co., 335 U.S. 
525 (1949). 
23 Coppage v. Kansas, 236 U.S. 1 (1915), overruled by Lincoln Union v. Northwestern Co., 335 U.S. 525 
(1949). 
24 Adkins v. Children's Hospital, 261 U.S. 525 (1923), overruled by West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 
U.S. 379 (1937). 
12 
 
[This] case is decided upon an economic theory which a large part of the country does not 
entertain. If it were a question whether I agreed with that theory, I should desire to study 
it further and long before making up my mind. But I do not conceive that to be my duty, 
because I strongly believe that my agreement or disagreement has nothing to do with the 
right of a majority to embody their opinions in law. … I think that the word liberty in the 
Fourteenth Amendment is perverted when it is held to prevent the natural outcome of a 
dominant opinion, unless it can be said that a rational and fair man necessarily would 
admit that the statute proposed would infringe fundamental principles as they had been 
understood by the traditions of our people and our law.25 
Holmes understood the magnitude of an unelected, unaccountable body overturning laws passed 
by representative majorities. Holmes raised and re-raised this critique with every new decision of 
the Lochner Court, until finally, the tides turned.  
In the 1934 case Nebbia v. New York, the Court was asked to overturn a law fixing the 
price of milk.26 Holmes’s argument finally won the day, the Court refused to overturn the law, 
and in the process articulated a much more deferential standard of review: 
[The] guaranty of due process [demands] only that the law shall not be unreasonable, 
arbitrary, or capricious, and that the means selected shall have a real and substantial 
relation to the object sought to be attained. … If the laws passed are seen to have a 
reasonable relation to a proper legislative purpose, and are neither arbitrary nor 
discriminatory, the requirements of due process are [satisfied].27 
While the Court did not disclaim all authority to review the substantive merits of legislation 
under the Due Process Clause, the standard of review they described was very deferential. So 
long as the reason behind the law was not arbitrary or capricious, and the law was reasonably 
related to achieving that interest—the law would withstand judicial review. 
 
25 Lochner, 198 U.S. at 74 (Holmes, J., dissenting). 
26 Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502 (1934). 
27 Id. at 502-03. 
13 
 
The nail in the coffin for the Lochner line of cases came three years later, in West Coast 
Hotel Co. v. Parrish.28 The Court reiterated the deferential standard of review used in Nebbia 
and overturned their previous ruling in Adkins. They also dismissed the notion of a “liberty of 
contract”: 
[T]he violation [of due process] alleged by those attacking minimum wage regulation for 
women is deprivation of freedom of contract. What is this freedom? The Constitution 
does not speak of freedom of contract. It speaks of liberty and prohibits the deprivation of 
liberty without due process of law. In prohibiting that deprivation the Constitution does 
not recognize an absolute and uncontrollable liberty. [Liberty] under the Constitution [is] 
necessarily subject to the restraints of due process, and regulation which is reasonable in 
relation to its subject and is adopted in the interests of the community is due process.29 
Justice Hughes, writing for the majority, discredits the Lochner cases on two fronts. First, he 
suggests that “liberty” should not be read so broadly—at least not so as to include a “freedom of 
contract.” While he does not propose an alternative way to determine what would constitute a 
deprivation of liberty, he implies that the word speaks for itself.  
Second, Justice Hughes draws attention to the second half of the Due Process Clause—
that liberty can be deprived by the law, so long as there is due process. Here, he describes the 
requirements of due process similarly to how the Court did in Nebbia.30 Laws must only be 
“reasonable” and “adopted in the interests of the community.” The Court would go on to affirm 
this deferential standard of review, now known as the “rational basis” standard.31 At the time 
 
28 West Coast Hotel, 300 U.S. 379. 
29 Id. at 391.  
30 Compare Nebbia, 291 U.S. at 503 (“If the laws passed are seen to have a reasonable relation to a proper 
legislative purpose, and are neither arbitrary nor discriminatory, the requirements of due process are [satisfied].”), 
with West Coast Hotel, 300 U.S. at 391 (“[R]egulation which is reasonable in relation to its subject and is adopted in 
the interests of the community is due process.”). 
31 See, e.g., United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 (1938) (“Even in the absence of 
[specific legislative findings], the existence of facts supporting the legislative judgment is to be presumed, for 
[legislation] is not to be pronounced unconstitutional unless in the light of the facts made known or generally 




West Coast Hotel was decided, this deferential standard was the only one the Court seemed 
willing to embrace—a “one size-fits-all” approach to Due Process jurisprudence which would 
invalidate only the most baseless state laws. The rational basis standard was the most direct way 
for the Court to ensure it would not repeat the mistakes of Lochner, striking down laws simply 
because they seemed unwise or overreaching. 
The Revival of Substantive Due Process 
The discrediting of Lochner, however, would not turn out to be the death of substantive 
due process, and the “rational basis” standard would not remain the Court’s only standard 
forever. The second-half of the 20th century would see a revival of substantive due process, albeit 
in very different cases than the “economic liberty” cases of the Lochner Court. This revival 
would focus on privacy and autonomy—opening the door for “equal dignity” to emerge at the 
turn of the century. 
Although the flurry of cases starting with Nebbia had overturned and discredited most of 
the substantive due process cases involving economic liberty, a few notable remnants survived, 
which dealt with non-economic strains of liberty. In Meyer v. Nebraska, the Court overturned a 
law that prohibited the teaching of foreign languages to young children.32 The law was found to 
materially interfere with the liberty of modern language teachers to pursue their calling and the 
liberty of parents to control their children’s education. In a similar case, Pierce v. Society of 
 
knowledge and experience of the legislators.”); Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 348 U.S. 483, 488 (1955) (“It is 
enough that there is an evil at hand for correction, and that it might be thought that the particular legislative measure 
was a rational way to correct it.”). 
32 Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923). 
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Sisters, the Court struck down an Oregon law that required parents to send their children to 
public schools.33  
Although these cases remained good precedent, the Court did not invoke substantive due 
process again for several decades following Nebbia and West Coast Hotel, until they took on 
Griswold v. Connecticut in 1965. The Connecticut law being challenged banned the use of 
contraceptives, and the Court decided to invalidate it.34 But the seven justices in favor of this 
result disagreed sharply on the constitutional basis. The majority opinion, authored by Justice 
Douglas, had the disgrace of Lochner top of mind. The majority expressly disclaimed a 
substantive due process basis: 
[W]e are met with a wide range of questions that implicate the Due Process Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment. Overtones of some arguments suggest that [Lochner] should be 
our guide. But we decline that invitation. [W]e do not sit as a super-legislature to 
determine the wisdom, need, and propriety of laws that touch economic problems, 
business affairs, or social conditions.35 
Instead, the majority based their holding in an implied right to privacy found in the “penumbras” 
of the Constitution—citing the First, Third, Fourth, Fifth, and Ninth Amendments.36  
Justice White, in concurrence, did invoke the Due Process Clause—but only with the 
deferential “rational basis” standard of review, articulated in the post-Lochner cases.37 Justice 
White concluded that even under the most deferential standard, there was no rational basis for 
the law banning contraceptives. 
 
33 Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925). 
34 Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965). 
35 Id. at 481-482.  
36 See id. at 484. 
37 See id. at 505 (White, J., concurring) (“I wholly fail to see how the ban on the use of contraceptives by 
married couples in any way reinforces the State's ban on illicit sexual relationships.”). 
16 
 
Justice Harlan, though, advocated for reviving substantive due process—and giving the 
notion teeth again. Harlan rejected the notion that the Court had to find an express or implied 
right in some other part of the Constitution before invoking the Due Process Clause.38 Instead, he 
said that the proper question is whether or not the statute “violates basic values ‘implicit in the 
concept of ordered liberty.’”39 Harlan recognized the danger of an unfettered judicial review but 
wrote that judicial self-restraint would come from “respect for the teachings of history” and 
“recognition of the basic values that underlie our society.”40 
Harlan also laid out a fairly comprehensive theory of how the Due Process Clause should 
operate. In doing so, he relied expressly on his dissent in Poe v. Ullman a few years prior.41 The 
methodology Harlan spelled out in his Poe dissent has since been cited many times in 
substantive due process cases,42 and the Court would go on to battle over whether it should be 
the controlling methodology.43 Harlan wrote: 
Due process has not been reduced to any formula; its content cannot be determined by 
reference to any code. The best that can be said is that through the course of this Court’s 
decisions it has represented the balance which our Nation, built upon postulates of respect 
for the liberty of the individual, has struck between that liberty and the demands of 
organized society, [having] regard to what history teaches are the traditions from which it 
 
38 See id. at 500 (Harlan, J., concurring) (“While the relevant inquiry may be aided by resort to one or more 
of the provisions of the Bill of Rights, it is not dependent on them or any of their radiations. The Due Process Clause 
of the Fourteenth Amendment stands, in my opinion, on its own bottom.”). 
39 Id. 
40 Id. at 501.  
41 See id. at 500 (citing Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497 (1961)). 
42 See, e.g., Moore v. East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 499 (1977); Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. 
Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 847 (1992); Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 287 (1994); Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 
2584, 2598 (2015). 
43 Compare, e.g., Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 752 (1997) (Souter, J., concurring in the 
judgment) (arguing that Justice Harlan’s methodology in Poe should be controlling), with id. at 721-722 (majority 
opinion) (arguing that adopting Justice Harlan’s methodology would mean “abandoning [the] restrained 
methodology” which is consistent with “the development of this Court's substantive-due-process jurisprudence”). 
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developed as well as the traditions from which it broke. That tradition is a living thing. 
[The] full scope of the liberty guaranteed by the Due Process Clause cannot be found in 
or limited by the precise terms of the specific guarantees elsewhere provided in the 
Constitution. This ‘liberty’ is not a series of isolated points pricked out in terms of [such 
specific guarantees as speech and religion]. It is a rational continuum which, broadly 
speaking, includes a freedom from all substantial and arbitrary impositions and 
purposeless restraints, and which also recognizes [that] certain interests require careful 
scrutiny of the state needs asserted to justify their abridgement.44 
In this passage, Justice Harlan lays out something close to a full-bodied theory of substantive due 
process. There are five important elements to Justice Harlan’s theory of substantive due process. 
First, application of the Due Process Clause cannot be “reduced to any formula.” 
Judicially-created tests and multi-step formulas are often helpful to facilitate consistent 
application of otherwise vague constitutional provisions. But Harlan suggests that no such 
formula is appropriate for substantive due process. 
Second, Harlan frames the Due Process Clause as striking a “balance…between liberty 
and the demands of organized society.” This is an explicitly substantive view of the Clause. 
Harlan is advocating for the Court to perform a weighing of sorts—between individual liberty 
and proper governmental interests. When a state law passed in furtherance of one of these 
interests infringes on a person’s liberty, Harlan believes the Due Process Clause obligates the 
Supreme Court to scrutinize that law. 
Third, Harlan posits that tradition should be the Court’s guide in this endeavor. In 
determining tradition, the Court should look to “what history teaches” but also remember that 
“tradition is a living thing.” Although Harlan does not clarify exactly what he means by saying 
that tradition is “living,” he implies that narrow views of how America has operated historically 
may not always be appropriate to determine the requisite tradition.  
 
44 Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 542-43 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting). 
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The fourth point is closely related to the third. The liberty referenced in the Due Process 
Clause is not “a series of isolated points” but instead “a rational continuum.” This was in direct 
response to the dueling view at the time that the Due Process Clause only incorporated the 
specific guarantees of the rest of the Constitution against the states. But it also says something 
more basic about the Due Process Clause. Instead of reading “liberty” as referring to a collection 
of more specific rights (e.g. freedom of speech, freedom of religion, etc.), Harlan views liberty as 
a broad, stand-alone concept. Something either infringes liberty itself, or it does not.  
Finally, Harlan determines that certain infringements of liberty necessitate “careful 
scrutiny” of the asserted state interest.45 To understand what Harlan is referring to, one must 
understand the state of Equal Protection jurisprudence at the time Harlan was writing. By 1965, 
the Court had developed a system of “tiered scrutiny” in their application of the Equal Protection 
Clause. The default tier, like in Due Process cases, was the rational basis standard—a deferential 
level of scrutiny which almost always resulted in the validation of the state law.46 However, a 
famous footnote in United States v. Carolene Products Co. suggested that certain considerations 
could necessitate “more exacting judicial scrutiny.”47 This idea gained traction, and by the time 
of Griswold, the Court had already ruled in equal protection contexts that laws based on certain 
classifications did demand heightened scrutiny.48 In other words, the Court would be far more 
 
45 Id. 
46 See TRIBE, supra note 15, § 16-2, at 1442-1443 (“The traditional deference both to legislative purpose 
and to legislative selections among means continues . . . to make the rationality requirement largely equivalent to a 
strong presumption of constitutionality.”). 
47 United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 153 (1938). The conditions which could call for 
heightened scrutiny included when legislation “appears on its face to be within a specific prohibition of the 
Constitution,” or “restricts those political processes which can ordinarily be expected to bring about repeal of 
undesirable legislation,” or is motivated by “prejudice against discrete and insular minorities.”  
48 See, e.g., Oyama v. California, 332 U.S. 633, 645–46 (1948) (subjecting a land-transfer statute that 
discriminated on the basis of national origin to heightened scrutiny). 
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skeptical of the alleged purpose of the law and the means selected to achieve that end. While the 
rational basis standard generally results in the Court upholding state laws, strict scrutiny has the 
opposite effect—nearly always invalidating the state law at issue.49 
 So when Justice Harlan wrote that “certain interests require careful scrutiny of the state 
needs asserted to justify their abridgement,” he was arguing that the Court should adopt the same 
“tiers of scrutiny” approach in due process cases that they were already employing in equal 
protection cases. More specifically, Harlan contended that abridgements of “important 
fundamental liberties” should warrant heightened scrutiny.50 When fundamental liberties are at 
stake, it should be insufficient to show that the statute is merely rational. In other words, the 
Court should give substantive due process bite again. 
Justice Harlan’s views, though they did not win the day in Griswold, did not fall on deaf 
ears. Eight years later, the Court signaled its willingness to revive substantive due process, in the 
landmark case of Roe v. Wade. While in Griswold, the Court expressly disclaimed a Fourteenth 
Amendment due process rationale, the Court in Roe would waffle a bit on this point. Building off 
Griswold, the majority determined that a woman’s right to an abortion fell under the broader 
“right of privacy.”51 As for where that right was located in the Constitution, the Court wrote:  
This right of privacy, whether it be founded in the Fourteenth Amendment’s concept of 
personal liberty [as] we feel it is, or, as the District Court determined, in the [Ninth 
 
49 See Gerald Gunther, The Supreme Court, 1971 Term — Foreword: In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a 
Changing Court: A Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARV. L. REV. 1, 8 (1972) (describing strict scrutiny as 
“‘strict’ in theory and fatal in fact”); TRIBE, supra note 15, § 16-30, at 1089 (describing strict scrutiny as a “virtual 
death-blow”). 
50 See Poe, 367 U.S. at 554 (Harlan, J., dissenting) (“[Since the law] marks an abridgement of important 
fundamental interests, [it] will not do to urge in justification [that] the statute is rationally related to the effectuation 
of a proper state purpose. A closer scrutiny and stronger justification than that are required.”). 
51 Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
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Amendment], is broad enough to encompass a woman’s decision whether or not to 
terminate her pregnancy.52 
The majority wrote that they “feel” the right of privacy is based in the Due Process Clause, 
although they undercut that by also referencing the “penumbras” rationale of Griswold, plus the 
First, Fourth, Fifth, and Ninth Amendments.53 The Court was not ready to fully embrace 
substantive due process again, yet.  
Several justices, though, interpreted the majority opinion in Roe as doing just that. Justice 
Stewart, who had dissented in Griswold, wrote in his concurrence that Griswold could only 
reasonably be understood as a substantive due process decision, and that now he was ready to 
“accept it as such.”54 He also quoted at length from Justice Harlan’s Poe dissent.55 Justice 
Rehnquist, in dissent, also saw Roe as a revival of substantive due process—although he 
disagreed with it. He wrote that the Court should have employed a rational basis test, and that by 
not doing so, the Court was making the same mistake as the Lochner Court.56 
The Court’s momentum, however, would prove irreversible. Slowly, the Court began 
once again using substantive due process as a basis to invalidate state laws, for the first time 
since Lochner. They did so in a way that largely followed the blueprint Justice Harlan laid out in 
 
52 Id. at 153.  
53 See id. at 152 (citing Griswold, as well as the First, Fourth, Fifth, and Ninth Amendments). But see id. at 
165 (holding that the Texas law “is violative of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment”).  
54 Id. at 168 (Stewart, J., dissenting). 
55 See id. at 168-69.  
56 See id. at 174 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). 
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his Poe dissent—deeming liberty interests “fundamental” and applying strict scrutiny. This 
resulted in decisions protecting abortion rights,57 marriage rights,58 and family rights.59 
The revival of substantive due process would pick up steam over the next fifty years, 
although not without its setbacks and attempts to slow its expansion. Its reincarnation, however, 
would prove to be of a noticeably different flavor than its Lochner-era predecessor. While the 
Lochner cases had focused on liberty of contract, the cases flowing from Griswold centered on 
privacy, autonomy, and ultimately, dignity.  
  
 
57 See, e.g., Planned Parenthood of Missouri v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52 (1976) (holding that a blanket 
parental consent requirement for a minor to obtain an abortion is unconstitutional). 
58 See, e.g., Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967). 
59 See, e.g., Moore v. East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1977) (holding that a housing ordinance unduly 




Chapter Two: The Emergence of “Dignity” in Fourteenth Amendment Cases 
Although dignity would come to center-stage a decade later in the gay rights cases, its 
first appearance would come as the Court was forced to reckon with its decision in Roe v. Wade. 
In 1992, the Court prepared to decide Planned Parenthood v. Casey, a direct challenge to Roe. 
The nation awaited a seismic overruling.60 Over the intervening decades, the Court had slowly 
chipped away at abortion rights.61 Roe had been sharply criticized both publicly62 and as a matter 
of constitutional law.63 
Planned Parenthood v. Casey 
To the surprise of the nation, Roe survived.64 A five-justice majority of O’Connor, 
Souter, Kennedy, Blackmun, and Stevens voted to uphold Roe, spearheaded by a joint opinion by 
O’Connor, Souter, and Kennedy. No author was listed on the opinion. Rather than giving the 
impression that any one justice was spearheading the opinion and its rationale, the three justices 
wanted it to be clear that they were speaking with one voice. 
 
60 Leon Friedman, Introduction to THE SUPREME COURT CONFRONTS ABORTION at 12 (Leon Friedman ed., 
1993). 
61 See, e.g., Webster v. Reproductive Health Services, 492 U.S. 490 (1989) (upholding a law prohibiting the 
use of governmental facilities for abortions) 
62 See generally Nadine Brozan, Abortion Ruling: 10 Years of Bitter Conflict, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 15, 1983, § 
1, at 17. 
63 See, e.g., John Hart Ely, The Wages of Crying Wolf: A Comment on Roe v. Wade, 82 YALE L.J. 920, 943 
(1973) (arguing that Roe “sets itself a question the Constitution has not made the Court’s business”); Laurence H. 
Tribe, The Supreme Court: 1972 Term, 87 HARV. L. REV. 1, 7 (1973) (noting that “behind its own verbal 
smokescreen, the substantive judgment on which [Roe] rests is nowhere to be found”); CHARLES FRIED, ORDER AND 
LAW: ARGUING THE REAGAN REVOLUTION – A FIRSTHAND ACCOUNT 75-81 (1991) (describing Roe as “a prime 
example of twisted judging” and “a relentless series of non sequiturs and ipse dixits”); ROBERT H. BORK, 
SLOUCHING TOWARDS GOMORRAH: MODERN LIBERALISM AND THE AMERICAN DECLINE 173-185 (1996) (calling 
Roe a “radical deformation of the Constitution”). 
64 Friedman, supra note 60, at 14. 
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As a matter of constitutional law, however, the joint opinion was much more explicit 
regarding its reasoning than the Court in Roe. Where Roe had cited the unenumerated “right to 
privacy” referenced in Griswold and determined that it was “broad enough to encompass a 
woman’s decision to terminate her pregnancy,”65 Casey grounded the right firmly in Fourteenth 
Amendment liberty. The authors of the opinion wrote: 
Our law affords constitutional protection to personal decisions relating to marriage, 
procreation, family relationships, child rearing, and education. … These matters, 
involving the most intimate and personal choices a person may make in a lifetime, 
choices central to personal dignity and autonomy, are central to the liberty protected by 
the Fourteenth Amendment. At the heart of liberty is the right to define one’s own 
concept of existence, of meaning, of the universe, and of the mystery of human life. 
Beliefs about these matters could not define the attributes of personhood were they 
formed under compulsion of the State.66 
Law professor Noah Feldman writes that this paragraph “will be Kennedy’s legacy.”67 The 
passage places a woman’s right to an abortion firmly in the scope of the “liberty” protected by 
the Fourteenth Amendment. Instead of focusing on privacy, the passage points to the broader 
concepts of “personal dignity and autonomy.” 
The plurality opinion was fairly transparent about how different its reasoning was than 
that of Roe. In fact, the opinion would go on to explicitly reframe Roe: 
Roe stands at an intersection of two lines of decisions … The Roe Court itself placed its 
holding in the succession of cases most prominently exemplified by Griswold v. 
Connecticut. … Roe, however, may be seen not only as an exemplar of Griswold liberty 
but as a rule (whether or not mistaken) of personal autonomy and bodily integrity, with 
doctrinal affinity to cases recognizing limits on governmental power to mandate medical 
treatment or to bar its rejection.68 
 
65 Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973). 
66 Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 851 (1992). 
67 Feldman, supra note 1. 
68 Casey, 505 U.S. at 857. 
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The Court here goes beyond simply affirming Roe. They also suggest to the reader of the 
opinion: Reconsider the way you see Roe. It might be a different sort of case than you—or the 
authors of Roe—thought. While the Court had been cautious in Roe and Griswold of reviving 
Lochner by grounding their decision in substantive due process, the Court in Casey signaled its 
willingness to invoke due process and simultaneously distinguish Lochner.69 
The Court understood how significant this step was. They did not intend to revive 
Lochner; they also did not want to start a new line of Fourteenth Amendment jurisprudence out 
of whole cloth. Their solution was to invoke a wide variety of Fourteenth Amendment cases 
(including the surviving remnants of the Lochner era) and suggest a common thread. Look again 
at the first paragraph, in which Kennedy writes of “choices central to personal dignity and 
autonomy.” He situates Casey’s relevant choice (whether to terminate a pregnancy) as one such 
dignitary choice. But he does more than that. By referencing precedent involving “marriage, 
procreation, family relationships, child rearing, and education,” the plurality opinion suggests 
that a wide assortment of Fourteenth Amendment cases—both Due Process and Equal 
Protection—have a common link to liberty. “Marriage” is an invocation of Loving v. Virginia.70 
“Procreation” of Griswold.71 “Family relationships” of Prince v. Massachusetts.72 “Child 
 
69 See id. at 861-62 (distinguishing Roe from Lochner by pointing out that in those cases “the clear 
demonstration that the facts of economic life were different than those previously assumed warranted the repudiation 
of the old law”). 
70 Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967). 
71 Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965). 
72 Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944). 
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rearing” of Pierce.73 “Education” of Meyer.74 Could all these cases have some underlying 
principle? This passage in Casey suggests that they do: dignity. 
Washington v. Glucksberg 
Five years later, though, the Court declined to read Casey so broadly regarding dignity 
and autonomy, in the case of Washington v. Glucksberg.75 The plaintiffs asked the Court to 
expand on its ruling in Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Dept. of Health—which had recognized 
“the principle that a competent person has a constitutionally protected liberty interest in refusing 
unwanted medical treatment.”76 But in contrast with Cruzan, which had involved the refusal of 
life-sustaining medical treatment, Glucksberg dealt with terminally ill patients who wished to 
hasten their death.77  
The Court refused to recognize such a right.78 In doing so, the “dignity” paragraph of 
Casey came up directly. Chief Justice Rehnquist wrote for the majority: 
[Language in Casey suggesting that] many of the rights and liberties protected by the Due 
Process Clause sound in personal autonomy does not warrant the sweeping conclusion 
that any and all important, intimate, and personal decisions are so protected, and Casey 
did not suggest otherwise.79 
The majority here displays a hesitancy to expand substantive due process—or read Casey in a 
way that would portend such expansion. Instead of reading that decision as uniting the Court’s 
 
73 Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925). 
74 Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923). 
75 Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702 (1997). 
76 Cruzan ex rel. Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Department of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 278 (1990) [hereinafter 
Cruzan]. 
77 See Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 707-08. 
78 See id. at 728. 
79 Id. at 727-28. 
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substantive due process precedents behind broad concepts of dignity and autonomy, Rehnquist 
interprets the paragraph as merely noting a common theme of substantive due process cases.80  
The conservative majority knew that there was much more at stake in Glucksberg than 
the narrow (albeit important) question of physician-assisted suicide. By 1997, there was no 
undoing the Court’s decision to revive substantive due process. But the approach they took in 
deciding Glucksberg was bound to have major implications for the next generation of substantive 
due process cases. Previous cases had left many questions up in the air. With this in mind, the 
majority opinion laid out a formulaic approach for dealing with substantive due process cases. It 
was not an entirely new approach, but the opinion did bring together and codify the formula 
more explicitly than in previous cases.81  
The Court acknowledged that “[t]he Due Process Clause guarantees more than fair 
process and the ‘liberty’ it protects includes more than the absence of physical restraint,”82 but 
framed its approach as one designed to “reign in the subjective elements that are necessarily 
present in due process”83 since “guideposts for responsible decisionmaking in this uncharted area 
are scarce and open-ended.”84 Critics, though, saw the Glucksberg methodology as an attempt by 
the conservative majority to keep substantive due process alive in name but not in fact, 
 
80 This is evident in Rehnquist’s careful choice of words. He writes that “many of the right and liberties 
sound in personal autonomy” (emphasis added). If he had instead written that many fundamental liberties “are based 
in” or “derive from” personal autonomy, it would imply that there are potentially other rights that could be derived 
from the basic principle of personal autonomy—an implication Rehnquist made sure to avoid. 
81 See generally Kenji Yoshino, A New Birth of Freedom?: Obergefell v. Hodges, 129 HARV. L. REV. 147, 
151-158 (2015) (describing how Glucksberg combined various elements from previous substantive due process 
cases into a cohesive whole that was more than the sum of its parts). 
82 Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 719. 
83 Id. at 722. 
84 Collins v. Harker Heights, 503 U.S. 115, 125 (1992). 
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describing it as “[nothing] more than a gambit toward hacking away not just at substantive due 
process but also at the nature of liberty itself.”85 The approach had two steps.  
First, the Court was to provide a “careful description” of the asserted liberty interest.86 
This requirement is the consequence of a deeper reality of substantive due process cases—
whether or not the right in question is deemed fundamental often turns on the level of generality 
at which it is defined. The more abstractly the right is described, the more likely it is to be 
deemed fundamental.87 Think back to Lochner v. New York. What if the Court—instead of 
invoking a broad “liberty of contract”—had instead examined the more specific “right for a 
baker to work more than forty hours a week”? There likely would have been no basis, historical 
or otherwise, to deem such a specifically-defined right to be fundamental. This also holds true in 
the “second-wave” substantive due process cases. What if the Court in Griswold had eschewed 
the “right to privacy” for the more specific “right to use contraceptives”? The case may have 
turned out differently.88  
What, then, of the Glucksberg requirement that the right in question had to be “carefully 
defined”? Kenji Yoshino, Professor of Constitutional Law at New York University School of 
Law, traces this requirement back to the 1989 case of Michael H. v. Gerald D.89 The case 
involved a child born out of an adulterous relationship, whose biological father was asserting a 
 
85 Laurence H. Tribe, Lawrence v. Texas: The “Fundamental Right” That Dare Not Speak Its Name, 117 
HARV. L. REV. 1893, 1923 (2004). 
86 Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 721. 
87 Laurence H. Tribe & Michael C. Dorf, Levels of Generality in the Definition of Rights, 57 U. CHI. L. 
REV. 1057, 1058 (1990). 
88 The Griswold Court benefitted from formulating the right broadly as a “right to privacy”—which 
allowed them to infer that right’s existence from the penumbras of various amendments. It would likely be more 
difficult to infer a “right to use contraceptives” from, say, the First Amendment’s guarantee of freedom of speech. 
89 Yoshino, supra note 81, at 154. 
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substantive due process right to a relationship with the child. The case would turn on the level of 
generality with which the right was construed. A biological parent (of a child conceived in an 
adulterous relationship) was asserting parental rights, like visitation. Although there was no 
majority opinion, Justice Scalia, writing for a four-justice plurality, determined that there were 
no such rights for “the natural father of a child adulterously conceived.”90 Justice Brennan, in 
dissent, came to the opposite conclusion by framing the asserted rights more broadly, as arising 
from the “parent-child relationship.”91 
In a footnote, Justice Scalia attempted to justify his narrow framing of the right (“the 
rights of the natural father of a child adulterously conceived”): “Though the dissent has no basis 
for the level of generality it would select, we do: We refer to the most specific level at which a 
relevant tradition protecting, or denying protection to, the asserted right can be identified.”92 In 
other words, Scalia’s preferred approach can be summed up as: the most specific level of 
generality possible. “Possible,” in this case, is synonymous (for Scalia, at least) with there being 
a relevant tradition to analyze.  
Notably, Justices Kennedy and O’Connor joined Justice Scalia’s entire opinion except 
that footnote (leaving only Rehnquist to join Scalia in the footnote). Justice O’Connor wrote that 
Scalia’s approach appears to be inconsistent with the Court’s approach in other cases, like 
Griswold: “On occasion the Court has characterized relevant traditions protecting asserted rights 
 
90 Michael H. v. Gerald D, 491 U.S. 110, 127 (1989) (plurality opinion). 
91 Id. at 142 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
92 Id. at 128 n. 6 (joined only by Justice Rehnquist). 
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at levels of generality that might not be ‘the most specific level’ available.”93 Justice Kennedy 
joined in this comment. 
Four years later, though, in Reno v. Flores, Justice Scalia was able to find five justices to 
sign on to a close relative of his “most specific level available” approach. Scalia wrote for the 
majority:  
“Substantive due process” analysis must begin with a careful description of the asserted 
right, for “[t]he doctrine of judicial self-restraint requires us to exercise the utmost care 
whenever we are asked to break new ground in this field.”94  
Yoshino calls “careful description” a “transparent Trojan horse for ‘specific description.’”95 
This maneuver allowed Justice Rehnquist in Glucksberg to gather a majority of the 
Court—including O’Connor and Kennedy—to sign on to the requirement for a “careful 
description” of the asserted right, citing Flores.96 Although “careful” is not synonymous with 
“specific,” the intent behind the two is the same. When rights are defined too broadly, the 
thinking goes, due process judicial review becomes unfettered and unguided. Therefore, we must 
define the right carefully, “lest the liberty protected by the Due Process Clause be subtly 
transformed into the policy preferences of the Members of this Court.”97 
The Court in Glucksberg was once again faced with multiple framings of the right in 
question. Was this a case dealing with the “right to die” or “the right to physician-assisted 
suicide”? Or perhaps “the right to control the time and manner of one’s imminent death”? 
 
93 Id. at 132 (O’Connor, J., concurring in part). 
94 Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 302 (1993) (alteration in original) (quoting Collins v. Harker Heights, 503 
U.S. 115, 125 (1992)). 
95 Yoshino, supra note 81, at 157. 
96 Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 721 (1997). 
97 Moore v. East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 502 (1977) (plurality opinion). 
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Ultimately, the “careful” description that the majority chose was “the right to commit suicide 
which itself includes a right to assistance in doing so.”98 This led into the second step of the 
Glucksberg approach. 
Once the right is carefully defined, according to Glucksberg, the Court must analyze 
whether the right in question is 1) “deeply rooted in this Nation’s history and tradition,”99 and 2) 
“implicit in the concept of ordered liberty” such that “neither liberty not justice would exist if 
they were sacrificed.”100 These formulations were borrowed from previous substantive due 
process cases, but Glucksberg was the first to make both of them essential to the analysis.101  
The first case to use the two requirements together was Bowers v. Hardwick, decided 
eleven years earlier. The Court faced a challenge to a Georgia statute outlawing sodomy. Despite 
the fact that the law banned all sodomy (both same- and opposite-sex) and the fact that the 
record never specified which type the defendant had been engaged in,102 the Court framed the 
right in question very narrowly, as a “right to engage in homosexual sodomy.”103 In a majority 
opinion authored by Byron White, the Court found that the Due Process Clause did not protect 
that right: 
Striving to assure itself and the public that announcing rights not readily identifiable in 
the Constitution’s text involves much more than the imposition of the Justices’ own 
choice of values on the States and the Federal Government, the Court has sought to 
identify the nature of the rights qualifying for heightened judicial protection. In Palko v. 
 
98 Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 723. 
99 Moore v. East Cleveland, 431 U.S. at 503. 
100 Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325-26 (1937) 
101 Yoshino, supra note 81, at 152. 
102 See Tribe supra note 85, at 1900 (footnote 20). See generally id. at 1951-1955 (describing his 
experience litigating Bowers at the Supreme Court). 
103 Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 191 (1986). 
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Connecticut (1937), it was said that this category includes those fundamental liberties 
that are “implicit in the concept of ordered liberty” such that “neither liberty nor justice 
would exist if [they] were sacrificed.” A different description of fundamental liberties 
appeared in Moore v. East Cleveland (1977) (opinion of Powell, J.), where they are 
characterized as those liberties that are “deeply rooted in this Nation’s history and 
tradition.” It is obvious to us that neither of these formulations would extend a 
fundamental right to homosexuals to engage in acts of consensual sodomy.104 
The Court found that the right in question failed both requirements, so there was no need to 
decide whether it would have been sufficient to meet only one. While it may seem trivial, the 
distinction is important—one can imagine any number of rights that are unsupported by tradition 
but are found to be “implicit in the concept of ordered liberty” (or vice-versa). The latter 
requirement is atemporal; the former is not. In Glucksberg, though, the Court found that both 
requirements must be met for a Fourteenth Amendment liberty interest to be deemed 
fundamental.  
So the Glucksberg Court set out to apply these standards to physician-assisted suicide. 
Most of their analysis went to the tradition requirement. The Court laid out the long history of 
laws against suicide, and the more recent laws against assisting someone else’s suicide—noting 
that these laws “never contained exceptions for those near death.”105 Unsurprisingly, the Court 
found no basis in tradition for the right to suicide, and thus decided that the alleged liberty 
interest was not a fundamental right necessitating strict scrutiny review.106  
Applying the rational basis standard, the majority found a multitude of legitimate 
government interests. These included: 1) “an ‘unqualified interest in the preservation of human 
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life,’”107 2) “an interest in protecting the integrity of the medical profession,”108 3) “an interest in 
protecting vulnerable groups—including the poor, the elderly, and disabled persons—from 
abuse, neglect, and mistakes,”109 4) “protecting disabled and terminally ill people from prejudice, 
negative and inaccurate stereotypes, and ‘societal indifference,’”110 and 5) “fear that permitting 
assisted suicide will start it down the path to voluntary and perhaps even involuntary 
euthanasia.”111 All of these added up to one conclusion: the rational basis standard was clearly 
met in this case.112 
Although the judgment was unanimous, the majority opinion penned by Justice 
Rehnquist was only joined by four other justices. Five justices wrote separately to note some 
departure from the majority. The Court understood how important the approach they took in 
Glucksberg would be to the future of substantive due process.  
The most common theme in the concurrences was a disagreement over how to properly 
frame the right in question. Justice O’Connor, although she joined the majority opinion in full, 
wrote that Glucksberg did not resolve “the narrower question whether a mentally competent 
person who is experiencing great suffering has a constitutionally cognizable interest in 
controlling the circumstances of his or her imminent death.”113 She saw no reason to reach that 
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question in Glucksberg because of the availability of pain medication designed to reduce end-of-
life suffering (even if it hastened death).114  
Other justices focused on how Cruzan and Casey could have served as better guides for 
framing the right. Justice Stevens wrote that the majority was reading those cases far too 
narrowly. Cruzan, in his view, involved not just Nancy Cruzan’s right to refuse treatment but 
also “her more basic interest in controlling the manner and timing of her death”115 and “her 
interest in dignity”;116 Casey involved “protection for matters ‘central to dignity and 
autonomy.’”117 Breyer expanded on Stevens’ argument: 
I would not reject the respondents’ claim without considering a different formulation, for 
which our legal tradition might provide greater support. That formulation would use 
words roughly like a “right to die with dignity.” But irrespective of the exact words used, 
at its core would lie personal control over the manner of death, professional medical 
assistance, and the avoidance of unnecessary and severe physical suffering—
combined.118 
This focus on dignity would prove prescient. The Court would invoke dignity with increasing 
frequency over the next twenty years. While a constitutional challenge to a physician-assisted 
suicide law is trivial if the right is framed as a “right to commit suicide” and the tradition inquiry 
is dispositive, a dignity-based approach could lead to a different outcome.  
Justice Souter’s concurrence attacked the majority’s approach more broadly. He 
understood that the Glucksberg approach, if cemented as the go-to framework for substantive 
due process review, likely spelled the end for significant expansions of Fourteenth Amendment 
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liberty. He took issue with the Glucksberg majority’s formulaic approach, writing that the Court 
should have instead adopted Justice Harlan’s approach in Poe119 (which had stated that 
substantive due process could not be “reduced to any formula”).120  
The majority addressed this point head-on. They acknowledged that their approach was a 
significant departure from Poe.121 But they disputed the precedential weight that should be given 
to the Poe dissent: 
[A]lthough Justice Harlan’s opinion has often been cited in due process cases, we have 
never abandoned our fundamental-rights-based analytical method. Just four terms ago, 
six of the Justices now sitting joined the Court’s opinion in Reno v. Flores; Poe was not 
even cited. And in Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dept. of Health, neither the Court’s nor the 
concurring opinions relied on Poe … True, the Court relied on Justice Harlan’s dissent in 
Casey, but, as Flores demonstrates, we did not in so doing jettison our established 
approach. Indeed, to read such a radical move into the Court’s opinion in Casey would 
seem to fly in the face of that opinion’s emphasis on stare decisis.122  
This passage makes one thing crystal clear. The majority in Glucksberg understood the 
significance of their approach—and the looming significance of the Poe dissent. Justice 
Rehnquist intended to establish the Glucksberg methodology as the definitive framework for 
substantive due process review, displacing the Poe dissent in the process.  
Indeed, Yoshino frames the debate about substantive due process from this point on as a 
tug-of-war between these two approaches: the “open-ended common law approach” of Poe and 
the “more close-ended formulaic approach” of Glucksberg.123 On one side fall Griswold, Roe, 
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and Casey; on the other, Bowers, Flores, and of course, Glucksberg. The Court’s next major 
decision between the two approaches would come as they were forced to reconsider their ruling 
in Bowers—through a challenge to a Texas statute banning homosexual sodomy. 
Lawrence v. Texas 
On September 17, 1988, four police officers in Harris County, Texas, entered the home of 
John Geddes Lawrence Jr. and observed him having consensual sexual intercourse with Tyron 
Garner, an acquaintance.124 The officers decided to charge the two men with violating Texas’s 
anti-sodomy statute, which made it a Class C misdemeanor if someone “engages in deviate 
sexual intercourse with another individual of the same sex.”125 The two men pleaded no contest 
and challenged the constitutionality of the Texas statute. 
When the case reached the Supreme Court, there were several paths available for the 
Court to take. The State Court of Appeals had found that the Supreme Court’s decision in 
Bowers v. Hardwick was controlling, and the law was not unconstitutional. The Texas law at 
issue in Lawrence, though, was different from the Georgia law upheld in Bowers in one key 
respect: where the Georgia law had banned all sodomy, no matter the sex of those involved, the 
Texas statute banned only homosexual sodomy.126 This left the Court with three primary options. 
First, they could uphold the lower-court decision and find that the Texas law was constitutional 
using the same reasoning as Bowers. Second, they could distinguish the two cases—leaving 
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Bowers in place but striking down the Texas law on Equal Protection grounds. Or finally, they 
could overrule Bowers and find the Texas law unconstitutional on Due Process grounds.  
By a 6-3 decision, the Supreme Court struck down the law—opting to take the third (and 
most extreme) route.127 The majority opinion was written by Justice Kennedy and joined by 
Justices Stevens, Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer. Justices Scalia, Rehnquist, and Thomas 
dissented, arguing that the Court should have taken the first route and upheld Bowers.128  
Justice O’Connor concurred in the judgment but employed a different reasoning than the 
majority opinion. She took the middle-ground approach, distinguishing Bowers and Lawrence 
and deciding the case on Equal Protection grounds.129 Her rationale was simple: the State can 
either ban all sodomy or ban none. But banning an act only when certain people commit it 
amounts to a violation of the Equal Protection Clause. Since the only interest Texas gave for the 
law was moral disapproval, Justice O’Connor concluded that the law could not sustain even 
rational basis review, writing that “[m]oral disapproval of a group cannot be a legitimate 
governmental interest under the Equal Protection Clause because legal classifications must not 
be ‘drawn for the purpose of disadvantaging the group burdened by the law.’”130  
The Court declined to take this narrow approach, however, opting instead to overrule 
Bowers and decide the case on Due Process grounds. In doing so, the Court also took a dramatic 
step away from the Glucksberg methodology. The majority opinion did not reference Glucksberg 
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once, instead relying on Casey and Romer v. Evans, an Equal Protection case. The Court’s 
approach departed from Glucksberg in three important ways. 
First, while Glucksberg had emphasized providing a “careful definition” of the right in 
question, Lawrence did not even name a specific right at issue. Instead it painted in broader 
brushstrokes, invoking “dignity,” “autonomy,” and most often simply “liberty.” Ultimately, the 
majority concluded that framing the right at issue as a “right to engage in homosexual sodomy” 
was far too narrow: 
To say that the issue in Bowers was simply the right to engage in certain sexual conduct 
demeans the claim the individual put forward, just as it would demean a married couple 
were it to be said marriage is simply about the right to have sexual intercourse. … When 
sexuality finds overt expression in intimate conduct with another person, the conduct can 
be but one element in a personal bond that is more enduring. The liberty protected by the 
Constitution allows homosexual persons the right to make this choice.131 
Instead of naming a specific right and consulting tradition to determine whether that right was a 
“fundamental right” deserving of substantive protection as a Fourteenth Amendment liberty 
interest, Lawrence invoked liberty directly.  
The reasoning behind this move is clear. At a certain point, flattening liberty interests into 
specific named rights trivializes liberty itself. At their core, are Lawrence and Bowers really 
about specific configurations of body parts—any more than Meyer and Pierce were about 
teaching kids foreign language or sending them to public school? The majority determined they 
were not, writing that Bowers’ framing of the right “discloses the Court’s own failure to 
appreciate the extent of the liberty at stake.”132 Following the Court’s decision, Tribe wrote that 
 




Lawrence could spell a general retreat from the focus on naming the right in question 
demonstrated in Bowers and Glucksberg: 
Lawrence’s focus on the role of self-regulating relationships in American liberty suggests 
that the “Trivial Pursuit” version of the due process “name that liberty” game arguably 
validated by Glucksberg has finally given way to a focus on the underlying pattern of 
self-government (rather than State micromanagement) defined by the rights enumerated 
or implicit in the Constitution or recognized by the landmark decisions construing it.133 
Whether this shift was general like Tribe describes (in a way that invalidates the Glucksberg 
exercise entirely) or more case-specific (with some distinguishing feature present in Lawrence 
that makes naming inappropriate) is a question left open by Lawrence. Regardless, the Court 
signaled a clear willingness to forego the “careful description” requirement. 
Second, the Court recast the role of history and tradition in substantive due process 
jurisprudence. While Glucksberg required that a right be “deeply rooted in this Nation’s history 
and tradition,” Lawrence defined a much more flexible role for tradition to play, one more in line 
with the Poe dissent’s admonition that “tradition is a living thing.” While the Bowers Court had 
found no historical basis for a “right to engage in homosexual sodomy,” the Lawrence Court put 
the law, rather than the right, on trial: is there a strong tradition against homosexual sodomy? The 
answer, the Court acknowledged, is not a simple one. While there is a substantial history of laws 
against sodomy generally (like the law in Bowers), the Court noted that it “was not until the 
1970’s that any State singled out same-sex relations for criminal prosecution, and only nine 
States have done so.”134 But, the Court acknowledged, the broader tradition of moral disapproval 
of homosexual sodomy is still pertinent: 
[F]or centuries there have been powerful voices to condemn homosexual conduct as 
immoral. The condemnation has been shaped by religious beliefs, conceptions of right 
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and acceptable behavior, and respect for the traditional family. For many persons these 
are not trivial concerns but profound and deep convictions accepted as ethical and moral 
principles to which they aspire and which thus determine the course of their lives. These 
considerations do not answer the question before us, however. The issue is whether the 
majority may use the power of the State to enforce these views on the whole society 
through operation of the criminal law. “Our obligation is to define the liberty of all, not to 
mandate our own moral code.”135 
In this passage, the Court was able to acknowledge a long-standing tradition against a practice, 
while also recognizing that this tradition is not dispositive. As Justice Kennedy wrote in County 
of Sacramento v. Lewis, and quoted in Lawrence, “[H]istory and tradition are the starting point 
but not in all cases the ending point of the substantive due process inquiry.”136  
 The other half of this equation is which tradition is most relevant. Is it the longstanding 
common law tradition against non-procreative sex, generally? Or perhaps the more recent laws 
specifically banning same-sex intimacy? The Court determined (without much in the way of 
explanation) that the last half-century was “of most relevance here.”137 More specifically, they 
identified “an emerging awareness that liberty gives substantial protection to adult persons in 
deciding how to conduct their private lives in matters pertaining to sex.” The Court concluded, 
“This emerging recognition should have been apparent when Bowers was decided.”138  
This is a much broader approach to history and tradition than that of Bowers and 
Glucksberg. It puts more emphasis on the Court’s own due process rulings concerning liberty 
than on a broader American tradition of moral disapprobation. It keeps its eyes open to the trends 
of tradition—allowing for an “emerging awareness” to weigh more heavily than a long-standing, 
 
135 Id. at 571 (quoting from Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 850 (1992)). 
136 County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 857 (1998). 
137 Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 571-72. 
138 Id. at 572. 
40 
 
unenforced law.139 It even allows for the consideration of extranational traditions.140 Ultimately, 
Justice Kennedy paints a much more dynamic portrait of history and tradition than the cold, 
inflexible tradition depicted in Glucksberg.  
Third, Lawrence never specified a formal standard of review. In the standard due process 
methodology, rights that are deemed “fundamental” trigger strict scrutiny. Non-fundamental 
rights only merit rational basis scrutiny, which simply requires that the law further some 
legitimate government interest. This “tiers of scrutiny” approach is a hallmark of Fourteenth 
Amendment jurisprudence.  
But it is unclear which tier of scrutiny the Court is employing in Lawrence. There is 
evidence in the majority opinion that they could be employing either standard. On the one hand, 
the opinion concludes with the statement that “[t]he Texas statute furthers no legitimate State 
interest which can justify its intrusion into the personal and private life of the individual.”141 This 
certainly sounds like the rational basis standard. Justice Scalia, for one, read the opinion this way 
in his dissent.142 
On the other hand, there is some evidence that the Court did think that it was dealing with 
fundamental rights—even if they were not framed so narrowly as “a fundamental right to 
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homosexual sodomy.” For one, the Court goes to great lengths to parallel the liberty interest at 
stake in Lawrence and other rights that the Court had deemed fundamental: those regarding 
“marriage, procreation, contraception, family relationships, child rearing, and education.”143 
Furthermore, although the Court never uses the magic words of “fundamental right,” they do use 
many of the familiar words—just in a somewhat different order. Tribe, for one, argues that the 
Court in Lawrence is clearly framing the liberty interest at stake as a fundamental right: 
[Arguing otherwise] requires overlooking passage after passage in which the Court’s 
opinion indeed invoked the talismanic verbal formula of substantive due process but did 
so by putting the key words in one unusual sequence or another—as in the Court’s 
declaration that it was dealing with a “protection of liberty under the Due Process Clause 
[that] has a substantive dimension of fundamental significance in defining the rights of 
the person.”144 
Even so, the Court’s decision not to state explicitly a formal standard of review is significant in 
and of itself. It marked just one more way that the Court was willing to depart from the 
Glucksberg formula and forge new ground in substantive due process. 
But why? Was there something unique about Lawrence that distinguished it from other 
due process cases—some distinguishing feature that merited a wholly different type of due 
process review? The answer, woven through the majority opinion like an inscription on a 
tapestry, is that perhaps Lawrence is not, solely, a due process case. After all, the Court was 
asked to overturn the law on due process and equal protection grounds. Although they framed 
their decision as a due process ruling, they suggested that the Equal Protection Clause also had a 
role to play in their reasoning: “Equality of treatment and the due process right to demand 
respect for conduct protected by the substantive guarantee of liberty are linked in important 
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respects, and a decision on the latter point advances both interests.”145 The Court went on to 
point out that a decision on Equal Protection grounds would invalidate a law as enforced, but it 
does not solve the more basic problem; criminalizing behavior closely associated with a 
particular group (e.g. sodomy and homosexuals) serves to stigmatize that group even if it is 
enforced equally, or not at all.  
Although the decision was grounded in the Due Process Clause, its focus on equality of 
treatment and the removal of stigma might be more important than any of its other departures 
from the Glucksberg methodology—and perhaps underlies them all. Tribe writes that Lawrence 
is, at its core, a reframing of the narrative of the Fourteenth Amendment:  
It is a narrative in which due process and equal protection, far from having separate 
missions and entailing different inquiries, are profoundly interlocked in a legal double 
helix. It is a single, unfolding tale of equal liberty and increasingly universal dignity. … 
Lawrence, more than any other decision in the Supreme Court’s history, both 
presupposed and advanced an explicitly equality-based and relationally situated theory of 
substantive liberty. The “liberty” of which the Court spoke was as much about equal 
dignity and respect as it was about freedom of action—more so, in fact.146  
In Lawrence, the Court recognized that their decision lay at the intersection of two inter-related 
considerations: the Due Process Clause’s protection of liberty and the Equal Protection Clause’s 
promise of parity. At this intersection, binding the “double helix” together, lies a promise of 
equal dignity. 
United States v. Windsor 
The next chapter in this narrative would come as the Court was asked to determine the 
constitutionality of the Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA), which provided a uniform definition 
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of marriage for all federal laws, as “only a legal union between one man and one woman.”147 
When President Clinton signed DOMA into law in 1996, no states permitted same-sex 
marriage;148 by the time it was challenged in 2013, though, twelve states recognized such 
marriages.149 When Edith Windsor’s spouse, Thea Spyer, died in February 2009, their marriage 
was a legally recognized one in New York, where the couple lived. Spyer’s will specified that 
her entire estate should pass on to Windsor, but because their marriage was not federally 
recognized because of DOMA, Windsor was forced to pay over $300,000 in estate taxes (instead 
of qualifying for a spousal exemption). In turn, she challenged the constitutionality of DOMA 
under the Equal Protection Clause, as applied to the federal government under the Fifth 
Amendment.150  
The Court sided with Windsor, by a 5-4 decision, striking down DOMA as 
unconstitutional. Justice Kennedy, once again, sided with the liberal wing of the Court and 
authored the majority opinion. But, like in Lawrence, his opinion did not give a single, clear 
rationale for why DOMA was unconstitutional. Instead, he tied in principles of federalism—
along with elements of due process and equal protection—in an opinion centered on the dignity 
conferred by the State in recognizing their marriage, which could not be deprived by the federal 
government. 
The dignity that Justice Kennedy wrote about in Windsor, though, was of a markedly 
different flavor than the dignity in Lawrence. In that opinion, dignity had been something 
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inherent in a person—something that the State was not allowed to demean with intrusive laws 
regarding intimate relational decisions.151 But in Windsor, dignity was something conferred by 
the State in its recognition of a couple’s marriage. Justice Kennedy wrote: 
[T]he State’s decision to give this class of persons the right to marry conferred upon them 
a dignity and status of immense import. When the State used its historic and essential 
authority to define the marital relation in this way, its role and its power in making the 
decision enhanced the recognition, dignity, and protection of the class in their own 
community.152 
Perhaps, though, this description of dignity is not as incompatible with the description in 
Lawrence as it might appear at first glance. Taking a step back, one can see that, taken together, 
Lawrence and Windsor actually paint a more holistic portrait of how human dignity operates 
with regard to the law. Dignity is something that can be both granted and taken away by the 
government.153 In areas of life where regulation is not the norm (like private decisions regarding 
sexual intimacy), the State can deprive people of dignity by choosing to regulate there anyway. 
In this area of life, the message goes, you are not given the same freedom as your fellow 
American to make these decisions for yourself. But in privileged areas of life where regulation is 
not only the norm but the gatekeeper (like marriage), the State can grant dignity by allowing one 
into that privileged status. Likewise, by denying access, the State can inflict dignitary harm.  
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Although this discussion of dignity as something conferred by the State appears to open 
the door to a decision based on principles of federalism, that is not the route that the Court chose 
to take.154 Instead, like in Lawrence, the Court relied on a blend of substantive due process and 
equal protection considerations.155 The exact role that each would play—as well as the precise 
basis for the Court’s decision—was again unclear; once again, the two considerations did not 
operate on parallel tracks, but rather as intertwined considerations, with each informing and 
reshaping the other.  
The core message of Windsor rested on both due process and equal protection grounds. 
From a due process perspective, DOMA deprived those with State-sanctioned marriages of 
dignity, and consequently liberty, by not recognizing their unions.156 From an equal protection 
perspective, DOMA singled out same-sex couples, choosing to treat as unequal couples that the 
State had chosen to treat alike.157 Justice Kennedy, tying these two considerations together, 
concluded: 
The liberty protected by the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause contains within it 
the prohibition against denying to any person the equal protection of the laws. While the 
Fifth Amendment itself withdraws from Government the power to degrade or demean in 
the way this law does, the equal protection guarantee of the Fourteenth Amendment 
makes that Fifth Amendment right all the more specific and all the better understood and 
preserved. … The federal statute is invalid, for no legitimate purpose overcomes the 
purpose and effect to disparage and to injure those whom the State, by its marriage laws, 
sought to protect in personhood and dignity. By seeking to displace this protection and 
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treating those persons as living in marriages less respected than others, the federal statute 
is in violation of the Fifth Amendment.158 
Dignity, once again, is the tie binding the Due Process and Equal Protection clauses.  
The dissenting justices decried the Court’s departure from standard Due Process and 
Equal Protection methodology. Justice Scalia, in particular, lambasted the majority opinion for 
not providing a single clear basis for its opinion and foregoing the standard tiers-of-scrutiny 
approach.159 What he failed to recognize, though, or perhaps did not want to acknowledge, was 
that the majority’s departure from the Glucksberg formula was not a lapse of memory. Rather, it 
was a calculated, deliberate advance of the Lawrence narrative, one in which the Due Process 
Clause and the Equal Protection Clause were getting wound ever tighter into the “double helix” 
Tribe had presciently described a decade earlier.  
Obergefell v. Hodges 
Marriage equality would prove to be the final, decisive chapter in this unfolding 
narrative. In Obergefell v. Hodges, the Court’s landmark decision that made same-sex marriage 
the law of the land, Justice Kennedy pulled together all the familiar characters—the “living 
tradition” of the Poe dissent, the “choices central to personal dignity and autonomy” of Casey, 
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the “right to demand respect” of Lawrence, the “dignity conferred by marriage” of Windsor—
into a fitting end for a story written, largely, by him. While it could have been decided much 
more narrowly,160 Kennedy instead decided to frame Obergefell as the sequel to another 
landmark marriage equality case, Loving v. Virginia, which had invalidated bans on interracial 
marriage. In doing so, the Court made explicit what had been suggested in ever clearer terms in 
the prior gay rights cases: the Due Process Clause and Equal Protection Clause are inseparably 
wound together—and at their intersection is a constitutional guarantee of equal dignity.  
A fitting sequel it was, too. After all, Loving was also—many years before—decided on 
dual equal protection and due process grounds.161 But where Loving had based its holding 
primarily on equal protection and pulled in due process as a supplement, Obergefell made it clear 
that the two examinations were interwoven: 
The Due Process Clause and the Equal Protection Clause are connected in a profound 
way, though they set forth independent principles. Rights implicit in liberty and rights 
secured by equal protection may rest on different precepts and are not always co-
extensive, yet in some instances each may be instructive as to the meaning and reach of 
the other. In any particular case one Clause may be thought to capture the essence of the 
right in a more accurate and comprehensive way, even as the two Clauses may converge 
in the identification and definition of the right. This interrelation of the two principles 
furthers our understanding of what freedom is and must become.162  
This passage is the most explicit statement of the synergy between the two clauses (a word the 
opinion itself would use to describe the relationship later on),163 and it also names some of the 
 
160 See, e.g., Yoshino, supra note 81, at 147 (“[C]onsider how much more narrowly the opinion could have 
been written. It could have invoked the equal protection and due process guarantees without specifying a formal 
standard of review, and then observed that none of the state justifications survived even a deferential form of 
scrutiny. The Court had adopted this strategy in prior gay rights cases.”). 
161 See Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967). 
162 Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2602 (2015). 
163 See id. at 2603. 
48 
 
specific ways in which the two considerations interact with each other. The first and most 
explicit way is in the “identification and definition of the right.” Less explicit is the statement 
that their interrelation “furthers our understanding of what freedom is and must become”;164 this 
sentence hints at the unique role that tradition must play when both liberty and equality are at 
stake. Obergefell’s handling of each of these two considerations—the definition of the right and 
the role of tradition—give clues as to how the interplay of the two clauses affects each.  
The first lesson comes from Obergefell’s framing of the right in question. Once again, the 
Court’s choice of how to frame the right would do much to determine the outcome of the case. 
Those against same-sex marriage asked the Court to consider the claim as an asserted “right to 
same-sex marriage”; those in favor preferred the broader “right to marry.”165 The Glucksberg 
requirement for a “careful description” of the right in question would seem to necessitate the 
former definition, and the respondents made that precise argument.166 The Court chose the 
broader “right to marry”—but addressed the Glucksberg argument directly: 
Objecting that this does not reflect an appropriate framing of the issue, the respondents 
refer to Washington v. Glucksberg, which called for a “careful description” of 
fundamental rights. They assert the petitioners do not seek to exercise the right to marry 
but rather a new and non-existent “right to same-sex marriage.” Glucksberg did insist that 
liberty under the Due Process Clause must be defined in a most circumscribed manner, 
with central reference to specific historical practices. Yet while that approach may have 
been appropriate for the asserted right there involved (physician-assisted suicide), it is 
inconsistent with the approach this Court has used in discussing other fundamental rights, 
including marriage and intimacy. Loving did not ask about a “right to interracial 
marriage”; Turner did not ask about a “right of inmates to marry”; and Zablocki did not 
ask about a “right of fathers with unpaid child support duties to marry.” Rather, each case 
 
164 Emphasis added. 
165 See id. at 2602. 
166 Brief for Respondent at 8, Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (No. 14-556). 
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inquired about the right to marry in its comprehensive sense, asking if there was a 
sufficient justification for excluding the relevant class from the right.167 
Here, Justice Kennedy acknowledges an explicit departure from the Glucksberg methodology (an 
opinion he had joined in full). Yoshino, though, notes that this passage “is open to at least two 
interpretations.”168 By stating that the Glucksberg approach “may have been appropriate,” the 
opinion leaves it open for a future Court to decide either 1) Glucksberg relied on an improperly 
narrow definition of the right in question or 2) there exists some principle that distinguishes 
Glucksberg from Obergefell, such that the “careful definition” approach was appropriate there 
but inappropriate here. Which of these answers is more fitting will be the subject of future 
analysis in this thesis. Regardless, the Court in Obergefell established one thing for certain: the 
“careful definition” requirement is far from a silver bullet for those seeking to slow the 
expansion of substantive due process. The only question left is whether it is a blank. 
The second lesson closely follows the first. Once the right is defined, what role do history 
and tradition have to play in determining whether it is fundamental? Obergefell’s guiding 
principle in this endeavor is actually found at the end of the paragraph quoted above. All those 
prior marriage equality cases proceeded by “asking if there was a sufficient justification for 
excluding the relevant class from the right.” This goes hand-in-hand with the more general 
definition of the right in question. Under the Glucksberg approach, the Court was to take its 
specific framing of the right (here, the “right to same-sex marriage”) and consult history and 
tradition to determine whether they supported the alleged fundamental right. But with a more 
general framing of the right (here, the “right to marry”), the analysis is flipped. First, the Court is 
 
167 Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2602. 
168 Yoshino, supra note 81, at 165. 
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to determine whether the broadly-defined right is fundamental by consulting principles from 
history and tradition. Then, given those principles, the Court should ask: do these principles 
reveal any reason why the group in question should be excluded from the asserted right? 
This is precisely the approach the Court took in Obergefell. The Court identified four 
“reasons marriage is fundamental under the Constitution.”169 First, “the right to personal choice 
regarding marriage is inherent in the concept of individual autonomy.”170 Second, “the right to 
marry…supports a two-person union unlike any other in its importance to the committed 
individuals.”171 Third, marriage “safeguards children and families and thus draws meaning from 
related rights of childrearing, procreation, and education.”172 Fourth, “marriage is a keystone of 
our social order.”173 The Court determined that these four principles and traditions formed the 
foundation of marriage; taken together, they are the reason the “right to marry” is fundamental. 
Because these four traditions “apply with equal force to same-sex couples,” the Court concluded 
that same-sex couples must be allowed to exercise the right to marry.174  
This exercise allows history and tradition to play a markedly different role than 
Glucksberg would have them play. It enables the Court to look past historical exclusions of 
marginalized groups from general rights to see the core principles that make the right 
fundamental in the first place—and whether those core principles merit the group’s exclusion. 
 
169 Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2599. 
170 Id. 
171 Id. 
172 Id. at 2600. 
173 Id. at 2601. 
174 Id. at 2599. 
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Broadly defined rights may not apply to every group who would assert them.175 But if the central 
reasons the right is fundamental apply equally to the group in question, the question becomes: 
why not? 
The Court grounded this approach in Justice Harlan’s Poe dissent,176 which had framed 
tradition as a “living thing” and emphasized that substantive due process “has not been reduced 
to any formula.”177 The Court’s discussion of the role of history and tradition clearly echoed the 
decision in Lawrence a decade earlier. The Obergefell majority wrote: 
History and tradition guide and discipline this inquiry but do not set its outer boundaries. 
That method respects our history and learns from it without allowing the past alone to 
rule the present. The nature of injustice is that we may not always see it in our own times. 
The generations that wrote and ratified the Bill of Rights and the Fourteenth Amendment 
did not presume to know the extent of freedom in all of its dimensions, and so they 
entrusted to future generations a charter protecting the right of all persons to enjoy liberty 
as we learn its meaning. When new insight reveals discord between the Constitution’s 
central protections and a received legal stricture, a claim to liberty must be addressed.178 
The themes of Lawrence are unmistakable. History is the starting point of due process inquiry, 
but not its ending point.179 The framers were modest, and they did not presume to know the full 
extent of liberty.180 An “emerging awareness” or “new insight” should weigh heavily on the 
 
175 For example, can polygamous unions exercise the “right to marry”? Can siblings? Or minors?  
176 See Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2599 (“[I]n assessing whether the force and rationale of its cases apply to 
same-sex couples, the Court must respect the basic reasons why the right to marry has long been protected.”) (citing 
Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 542-553 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting)). 
177 Poe, 367 U.S. at 542 (Harlan, J., dissenting). 
178 Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2598.  
179 Compare Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2598 (“History and tradition guide and discipline this inquiry but do 
not set its outer boundaries.”), with Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 572 (2003) (“[H]istory and tradition are the 
starting point but not in all cases the ending point of the substantive due process inquiry.”) (quoting from County of 
Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 857 (1998)). 
180 Compare Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2598 (“The generations that wrote and ratified the Bill of Rights and 
the Fourteenth Amendment did not presume to know the extent of freedom in all of its dimensions, and so they 
entrusted to future generations a charter protecting the right of all persons to enjoy liberty as we learn its meaning.”), 




Court’s mind in this process.181 However, by not overruling Glucksberg (or even referencing it in 
regard to history and tradition), the Court does leave the door cracked open, as to whether there 
might still be a place for the Glucksberg tradition requirements. What is undeniable is that the 
Glucksberg requirements, if not completely displaced, are severely cabined and undermined. 
These two lessons illuminate how the Court deals with fundamental rights cases at the 
intersection of due process and equal protection. One final takeaway from Obergefell, however, 
must be noted before proceeding further. Not only does Obergefell provide a vivid picture of 
how the Court’s analysis should operate at that intersection, it also provides clues for how to 
determine whether a particular case lies at that intersection.  
In short, cases that implicate both due process and equal protection considerations center 
on what Yoshino terms “antisubordination liberty.”182 In other words, deprivations of liberty 
from historically subordinated groups necessarily implicate both Clauses. Justice Kennedy 
advanced this idea, although not in the same terms, in all the gay rights cases—particularly in his 
discussions of human dignity. In each case, he referenced not only the face-value impact of the 
laws, but also the stigma imposed on homosexuals as a group.183 In Obergefell, after describing 
 
Amendment or the Fourteenth Amendment known the components of liberty in its manifold possibilities, they might 
have been more specific. They did not presume to have this insight. They knew times can blind us to certain truths 
and later generations can see that laws once thought necessary and proper in fact serve only to oppress.”). 
181 Compare Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2598 (“When new insight reveals discord between the Constitution’s 
central protections and a received legal stricture, a claim to liberty must be addressed.”), with Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 
571-72 (“In all events we think that our laws and traditions in the past half century are of most relevance here. These 
references show an emerging awareness that liberty gives substantial protection to adult persons in deciding how to 
conduct their private lives in matters pertaining to sex.”). 
182 See Yoshino, supra note 81, at 174. 
183 See, e.g., Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 575 (arguing that laws banning sodomy can stigmatize homosexuals 
even if unenforced); United States v. Windsor, 570 U.S. 744, 770 (2013) (stating that the purpose and effect of 
DOMA is to stigmatize those who enter into same-sex marriages); Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2600 (describing the 
stigma that children of same-sex parents suffer when states exclude same-sex marriages). 
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once again the stigmatizing and demeaning effect of the laws,184 Justice Kennedy explicitly ties 
subordination concerns to the intersection of due process and equal protection: 
It is now clear that the challenged laws burden the liberty of same-sex couples, and it 
must be further acknowledged that they abridge central precepts of equality. Here the 
marriage laws enforced by the respondents are in essence unequal: same-sex couples are 
denied all the benefits afforded to opposite-sex couples and are barred from exercising a 
fundamental right. Especially against a long history of disapproval of their relationships, 
this denial to same-sex couples of the right to marry works a grave and continuing harm. 
The imposition of this disability on gays and lesbians serves to disrespect and subordinate 
them.185 
This is a critical piece of the puzzle. Even if the Due Process and Equal Protection clauses are 
intertwined, certainly not every case that implicates one implicates the other. The Court itself 
acknowledged that fact, in its assurance that rights secured by the two clauses “are not always 
co-extensive.”186 This passage helps clarify the would-be Venn diagram of the two 
considerations by defining a key characteristic of their area of intersection: antisubordination.  
Justice Kennedy capped off the majority opinion in Obergefell with a rhetorical flourish 
fitting for a book’s final pages. He doubtless knew the significance of his vote and the opinion he 
authored—both what the decision meant for the soon-to-be newlyweds across the country and 
for the next generation of Fourteenth Amendment cases. He ended the majority opinion by 
invoking the dignity which had served as the theme of his narrative, writing of the plaintiffs: 
“Their hope is not to be condemned to live in loneliness, excluded from one of civilizations’ 
 
184 See Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2602 (“But when that sincere, personal opposition [of those who oppose 
same-sex marriage as a moral matter] becomes enacted law and public policy, the necessary consequence is to put 
the imprimatur of the State itself on an exclusion that soon demeans or stigmatizes those whose own liberty is then 
denied. Under the Constitution, same-sex couples seek in marriage the same legal treatment as opposite-sex couples, 
and it would disparage their choices and diminish their personhood to deny them this right.) (emphasis added). 
185 See id. at 2604.  
186 Id. at 2602. 
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oldest institutions. They ask for equal dignity in the eyes of the law. The Constitution grants 
them that right.”187 
  
 




Chapter Three: How Equal Dignity Operates 
We find ourselves now with Justice Kennedy’s book closed in front of us. Obergefell was 
the last major decision in the string of gay rights cases. Kennedy no longer sits on the Court. As 
any reader knows, though, a good book leaves the reader changed. The final words are never 
really the end; in fact, often, the reader is left with more questions than answers. Such is the case 
with Kennedy’s narrative of equal dignity. Many questions remain. The most important, 
overarching of which is: where exactly does this leave us? Just how different are we than when 
this all began? 
On the one hand, perhaps the narrative is self-contained. One could argue that Justice 
Kennedy’s markedly different approach to Fourteenth Amendment jurisprudence in the gay 
rights cases owes to some distinguishing feature of gay rights, making those cases unique and 
their lessons bounded. On the other hand, perhaps Justice Kennedy was doing nothing less than 
rewriting the status quo in these cases. This line of interpretation would frame equal dignity as 
the label for the new normal in Fourteenth Amendment cases. Due process and equal protection 
now operate in tandem; the formulaic Glucksberg approach is a relic with no use for today’s due 
process cases.  
Perhaps, though, the answer is neither. I will argue that there is still a place for the 
Glucksberg approach, and for the more rigid tiers of scrutiny analyses associated with the Due 
Process and Equal Protection clauses. In cases where only due process or equal protection are 
implicated (and such cases do exist), these frameworks are appropriate—necessary, in fact. But 
there is another class of cases, which includes but is not limited to the gay rights cases, where 
these standard frameworks are inappropriate. Specifically, cases that lie at the intersection of the 
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Due Process and Equal Protection clauses—cases that deal with antisubordination—are 
positioned at a “blind spot” of the standard approaches. These cases necessitate a different sort of 
framework, one that draws in elements of both clauses. These cases demand the framework laid 
out by Justice Kennedy in the equal dignity cases.  
Due Process and Equal Protection – The Traditional View 
Before diving into the nuts and bolts of this synthesized Due Process/Equal Protection  
framework, though, it is worth describing the traditional view of the two clauses. Obviously, the 
development of the Court’s jurisprudence was not deterministic; if several close decisions had 
gone the other way, the “traditional” understanding of the two clauses might have turned out 
quite differently. But, before the gay rights cases, the Court’s precedents painted a fairly 
cohesive picture of the different roles the Due Process and Equal Protection clauses should play. 
This traditional understanding is best captured by Cass Sunstein in his 1988 article, Sexual 
Orientation and the Constitution, written in the wake of Bowers v. Hardwick: 
From its inception, the Due Process Clause has been interpreted largely (though not 
exclusively) to protect traditional practices against short-run departures. The clause has 
therefore been associated with a particular conception of judicial review, one that sees the 
courts as safeguards against novel developments brought about by temporary majorities 
who are insufficiently sensitive to the claims of history. 
The Equal Protection Clause, by contrast, has been understood as an attempt to protect 
disadvantaged groups from discriminatory practices, however deeply engrained and 
longstanding. The Due Process Clause often looks backward; it is highly relevant to the 
Due Process issue whether an existing or time-honored convention, described at the 
appropriate level of generality, is violated by the practice under attack. By contrast, the 
Equal Protection Clause looks forward, serving to invalidate practices that were 
widespread at the time of its ratification and that were expected to endure. The two 
clauses therefore operate along different tracks.188  
 
188 Cass R. Sunstein,  Sexual Orientation and the Constitution: A Note on the Relationship Between Due 
Process and Equal Protection, U. CHI. L. REV. 1161, 1163 (1988). 
57 
 
Put simply, the Due Process Clause looks backward; the Equal Protection Clause looks forward. 
The Due Process Clause is meant to maintain the historical status quo; the Equal Protection 
Clause is meant to disrupt it.  
This view of the two clauses is consistent with the Court’s Fourteenth Amendment 
jurisprudence up until the gay rights cases. Indeed, it is this view of the Due Process Clause that 
the conservative members of the Court intended to crystallize in Bowers and Glucksberg. Under 
this view, both decisions are understandable, even unavoidable. Purely looking backwards, there 
can be no basis for a “right to suicide” or a “right to homosexual sodomy.” The traditional view 
also matches cases like Prince,189 Michael H.,190 and Moore v. East Cleveland,191 which dealt 
with family relationships of various sorts. Each of these cases proceeded by measuring the state 
law at issue against history and tradition regarding familial rights. This was also the structure of 
analysis used in the Lochner-era due process cases (despite consensus that the outcome of those 
cases was incorrect).192 Even Roe reinforces this view of the Due Process Clause, despite its 
revolutionary character. The majority opinion spent nearly twenty pages covering the history of 
abortion from ancient times to now.193 The Court understood that history and tradition were the 
unavoidable backdrop of any Due Process case. 
Likewise, the traditional view of the Equal Protection Clause matches the Court’s 
jurisprudence in this area. The Court has used equal protection as the rationale for many of its 
 
189 Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944). 
190 Michael H. v. Gerald D, 491 U.S. 110 (1989). 
191 Moore v. East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1977). 
192 See, e.g., Sunstein, supra note 188, at 1172 (arguing that the structure of the Court’s reasoning in the 
Lochner cases matches this backwards-looking view of the Due Process Clause). 
193 See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 130-147 (1973). 
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most disruptive decisions—those regarding racial discrimination,194 gender equality,195 and 
voting rights.196 In all these cases, history was not the measuring stick—instead, it was equality. 
For this reason, the Equal Protection Clause has been the Court’s weapon of choice when it 
comes to disrupting the status quo. 
Equal protection jurisprudence, however, has hit a roadblock. Historically, the primary 
mechanism the Court has used to break new ground in equal protection is to declare new 
“suspect classes.” This traces back to the famous Carolene Products footnote four, which noted 
that prejudice against certain “discrete and insular minorities” might merit heightened 
scrutiny.197 The Court decided to go down this route, identifying certain classifications which 
would immediately trigger strict scrutiny. Today, there are four suspect classes triggering strict 
scrutiny (race,198 national origin,199 alienage,200 and nonmarital parentage)201 and one more 
 
194 See, e.g., Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
195 See, e.g., United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515 (1996) (holding that a military institution's refusal to 
admit women is intentional gender discrimination in violation of the Equal Protection Clause). 
196 See, e.g., Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964) (holding that the Equal Protection Clause requires the 
apportionment of seats in a state legislature on a population basis). 
197 United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 153 (1938).  
198 See Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967). 
199 See Oyama v. California, 332 U.S. 633 (1948). 
200 See Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 (1971) (holding that states cannot restrict the eligibility of 
lawfully admitted resident aliens for welfare benefits under the Equal Protection Clause). 
201 See Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762 (1977) (holding unconstitutional a statute that permitted a child 
born out of wedlock to inherit only from his or her mother). 
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(sex)202 which triggers “intermediate scrutiny.” However, the Court has not added to this list 
since 1977,203 even though litigants have continued to urge them to do so.204  
The reason for this is obvious and seems unavoidable. There is no clear standard for what 
should qualify a minority to become a suspect class—and consequently, no clear end in sight to 
how lengthy and granular the list could become.205 Nearly every expansion would appear to open 
the door to ten new expansions, and so on.206 Eventually, this exercise of distinguishing between 
distinctions would effectively transform the Court into a countermajoritarian super-legislature, 
whose job is to question the merits of legislative distinctions. After all, group distinctions are 
 
202 See United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515 (1996). 
203 Nonmarital parentage was the last suspect classification identified by the Court. See Trimble, 430 U.S. at 
766-76. See generally Kenji Yoshino, The New Equal Protection, 124 HARV. L. REV. 747, 755-63 (arguing that “the 
canon has closed on heightened scrutiny classifications” but that this reality “must be tempered by acknowledging 
the Court’s use of a more aggressive form of rational basis review”). 
204 See, e.g., Brief of the National Lesbian & Gay Law Association et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of 
Petitioners at 3-4, Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003) (No. 02-102) (arguing that classification based on sexual 
orientation should draw heightened scrutiny); Brief of Appellant at 40-46, United States v. Watson, 483 F.3d 828 
(D.C. Cir. 2007) (No. 04-3090) (arguing for application of heightened scrutiny to peremptory challenges of blind 
jurors); Appellant’s Reply Brief at 2, Hedgepeth ex rel. Hedgepeth v. Washington Metro. Area Transit Auth., 386 
F.3d 1148 (D.C. Cir. 2004) (No. 03-7149) (arguing that youth as a class should be accorded intermediate scrutiny). 
205 Even before the Court was finished adding suspect classes, then-Justice Rehnquist expressed this 
concern. See Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U.S. 634, 657 (1973) (“Our society, consisting of over 200 million 
individuals of multitudinous origins, customs, tongues, beliefs, and cultures is, to say the least, diverse. It would 
hardly take extraordinary ingenuity for a lawyer to find ‘insular and discrete’ minorities at every turn in the road. 
Yet, unless the Court can precisely define and constitutionally justify both the terms and analysis it uses, these 
decisions today stand for the proposition that the Court can choose a ‘minority’ it ‘feels’ deserves ‘solicitude’ and 
thereafter prohibit the States from classifying that ‘minority’ differently from the ‘majority.’ I cannot find, and the 
Court does not cite, any constitutional authority for such a ‘ward of the Court’ approach to equal protection.”). 
206 The Court itself has expressed concern at this potentially slippery slope. See, e.g., Cleburne v. Cleburne 
Living Center, Inc., 473 U.S. 432 (1985) (“[I]f the large and amorphous class of the mentally retarded were deemed 
quasi-suspect for the reasons given by the Court of Appeals, it would be difficult to find a principled way to 
distinguish a variety of other groups who have perhaps immutable disabilities setting them off from others, who 
cannot themselves mandate the desired legislative responses, and who can claim some degree of prejudice from at 
least part of the public at large.”). 
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present in most legislation—and nearly every law can be challenged on the basis of some alleged 
inequality.207 The Court’s fear of going down this path seems justified. 
Thus we see that the traditional view of the two clauses leads almost inevitably to where 
the Court found itself at the turn of the century. For substantive due process, fear of an unfettered 
judicial review led to the Glucksberg requirements. For equal protection, fear of an unending 
parade of suspect classes led to that list being closed for new entries. This is not to say that these 
results were wrong. On the contrary, the fears behind them are valid—and the Court’s responses 
reasonable. But both approaches are predicated on the traditional view of the two clauses: that 
they operate on separate tracks, one “looking backwards” and the other “looking forwards.” 
Viewing the two clauses this way is not incorrect—it’s just incomplete. For cases that fit 
neatly into one category or the other, this interpretation is appropriate, and the standard 
approaches are as well. But antisubordination cases, which involve the deprivation of a 
fundamental liberty interest from a historically marginalized group, fall at the intersection of the 
two provisions. As I will attempt to demonstrate, both standard frameworks of analysis, due 
process and equal protection, are inadequate to remedy such harms on their own.  
The Inadequacy of Due Process 
The best lens for seeing the inadequacy of due process is Obergefell. Imagine that the 
Court had decided the case solely under the Due Process Clause, using the traditional 
interpretation of the provision. The Court would likely have followed the Glucksberg formula 
and carefully defined the asserted right as “a right to same-sex marriage.” Then, they would have 
 
207 See ELY, supra note 10, at 32 (“[A]ny case, indeed any challenge, can be put in an equal protection 
framework by competent counsel. If you wish to challenge the fact that you’re not getting good X, (or are getting 
deprivation Y) it is extremely probable that you will be able to identify someone who is getting good X (or is not 
getting deprivation Y).”). 
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looked backwards at history and tradition and found no justification for the asserted right.208 The 
challenge to traditional marriage definitions would die there—as it should, under this view! After 
all, the Due Process Clause is not supposed to reverse deeply entrenched practices. Same-sex 
marriage bans are by no means “short-run departures” from traditional values. 
The Obergefell majority understood why this approach was woefully inadequate. If the 
Due Process Clause is only allowed to look backwards, then long-running deprivations of 
fundamental liberties—ones so deeply engrained as to become fixtures of history and tradition—
could never be struck down under the Due Process Clause. In the words of Justice Kennedy, “If 
rights were defined by who exercised them in the past, then received practices could serve as 
their own continued justification and new groups could not invoke rights once denied.”209 This 
gets to the core of the problem. The Due Process Clause, under the traditional interpretation, is 
incapable of protecting the fundamental rights of historically disenfranchised minorities—
because the historical fact of their disenfranchisement can act as its own justification. 
The Inadequacy of Equal Protection 
But perhaps, as Sunstein argues, this is precisely the way it should be. Maybe it’s not the 
job of the Due Process Clause to right these wrongs. A screwdriver should not be criticized for 
its ineptitude at hammering nails. One might think the Equal Protection Clause is precisely the 
tool we seek when a law deprives minorities of fundamental rights. Unfortunately, it too proves 
an inadequate remedy—for two reasons.   
 
 
208 This is precisely the framework that the dissenting justices argued should have been used. See, e.g., 
Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2619 (2015) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting); id. at 2627-28 (Scalia, J., 
dissenting); id. at 2640 (Alito, J., dissenting). 
209 Id. at 2602 (majority opinion). 
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First, the equal protection analysis will all too often be condemned to rational basis 
territory, because the challenge does not involve a suspect class or a fundamental right. To see 
why, imagine the Court had decided to analyze Lawrence on solely Equal Protection grounds. 
While the Court was asked to identify sexual orientation as a suspect classification,210 they 
obviously declined. Likewise, the Court would have no basis for deciding that the case 
implicated a fundamental interest. For one, doing so would run into the same problems described 
above in the due process context.211 Additionally, as a practical matter, the Court has been even 
more reticent to declare fundamental rights in the equal protection context.212 Although it is very 
unlikely that the Court declares new suspect classifications, it is perhaps even less likely that 
they declare new fundamental interests in the equal protection context. Both chapters of equal 
protection jurisprudence appear to be closed—forcing all but a few specific categories of 
challenges to fight a losing battle under the rational basis standard. 
But there is a second reason equal protection is inadequate to remedy subordination on its 
own. This second inadequacy is best illustrated by examining the rationale Justice O’Connor 
used in her concurrence.213 O’Connor, after all, argued that the case should have been decided on 
solely equal protection grounds—invalidating the law even under the rational basis standard. She 
 
210 See supra note 204. 
211 See supra pp. 60-61. 
212 See NOAH R. FELDMAN & KATHLEEN M. SULLIVAN, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 805 (20th ed. 2019) (noting 
that “the Court has developed this line of cases in only a very few areas” and almost exclusively during the time of 
the Warren Court). 
213 See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 579 (2003) (O’Connor, J., concurring in the judgment). 
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reasoned that the ban on same-sex sodomy was unconstitutional because it singled out 
homosexuals—unlike the law that banned all sodomy in Bowers.214 
If the decision followed Justice O’Connor’s reasoning, lawmakers in Texas would have 
the standard two options available when a law is struck down due to equal protection: either ban 
all sodomy or ban none. Justice O’Connor thought only the latter was a realistic possibility. She 
wrote in her concurrence that she was confident that “so long as the Equal Protection Clause 
requires a sodomy law to apply equally to the private consensual conduct of homosexuals and 
heterosexuals alike, such a law would not long stand in our democratic society.”215 O’Connor, in 
other words, was confident that an equal protection ruling would be just as strong a remedy, 
effectively, as a due process one.  
This confidence, however, might have been misplaced. As Tribe points out, the fact that 
anti-sodomy laws were rarely if ever enforced means that heterosexuals—even when faced with 
a generally-applicable anti-sodomy law—would have little real incentive to advocate for its 
repeal.216 This, in turn, would leave in place the true harm of the laws, which was never really 
criminal prosecution in the first place.217 The mere fact of criminalization—even in the absence 
of any enforcement—serves to demean and stigmatize homosexuals and same-sex relationships. 
This is the case for both sex-neutral and same-sex sodomy bans.  
 
214 This sort of decision would be in line with the “rationality with bite” standard of review which the Court 
has employed instead of defining new suspect classes in more recent years. See generally Gayle Lynn Pettinga, 
Note, Rational Basis with Bite: Intermediate Scrutiny by Any Other Name, 62 IND. L.J. 779 (1987); Jeremy B. 
Smith, Note, The Flaws of Rational Basis with Bite: Why the Supreme Court Should Acknowledge Its Application of 
Heightened Scrutiny to Classifications Based on Sexual Orientation, 73 FORDHAM L. REV. 2769 (2005); Yoshino, 
supra note 203, at 760-63. 
215 Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 584-85 (O’Connor, J., concurring in the judgment). 
216 See Tribe, supra note 85, at 1910. 
217 See id. at 1896 (noting that anti-sodomy laws “have notoriously been honored in the breach and, almost 
from the start, have languished without enforcement”). 
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This is the understanding the majority came to in Lawrence. The Court wrote: 
If protected conduct is made criminal and the law which does so remains unexamined for 
its substantive validity, its stigma might remain even if it were not enforceable as drawn 
for equal protection reasons. When homosexual conduct is made criminal by the law of 
the State, that declaration in and of itself is an invitation to subject homosexual persons to 
discrimination both in the public and in the private spheres.218 
This is the second reason the equal protection clause alone is inadequate to address deprivations 
of fundamental liberties. When the State deprives a group of a fundamental liberty, which it 
grants to everyone else, a key component of the harm—in some cases, the primary component—
is what the law says. It is the message that you do not deserve the same rights as everyone else. 
And that message remains, even if the law is never (and can never) be enforced. Even if laws are 
unenforceable or forced to be facially neutral by an equal protection decision, the underlying 
subordination remains intact. 
Antisubordination Concerns – The “Blind Spot” of the Traditional Frameworks 
At this point, it has been demonstrated that when minority groups are deprived of 
fundamental liberties, neither traditional framework alone is a sufficient remedy. The Due 
Process Clause will allow historical deprivation to be its own justification; the Equal Protection 
Clause often will as well, and risks leaving the stigma of facially neutral laws in place.  
The essence of this practice, depriving minorities of their fundamental rights, is 
subordination.219 Justice Kennedy’s methodology in the gay rights cases was steeped in the 
recognition that subordination cannot be adequately remedied by traditional application of either 
 
218 Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 575 (majority opinion). 
219 See Tribe, supra note 2, at 18 (”[T]he freedom to marry championed in Obergefell was understood by all 
to directly redress the subordination of LGBT individuals.”); Yoshino, supra note 81, at 174 (“[O]ne of the major 




clause in isolation. Instead, he tied the two considerations together into a doctrine of equal 
dignity. This doctrine of antisubordination operates in the blind spot of the other two approaches.  
Although it came to life in the gay rights cases, the reach of antisubordination is far 
wider. The equal dignity methodology (which will be summarized later in this chapter) should be 
used whenever a case involves a minority group alleging historical deprivation of fundamental 
liberties. Looking back over the course of the Court’s substantive due process cases, one can see 
many cases that do not deal with antisubordination, and a few that might. For example, Griswold 
clearly does not involve minority rights. Such a case can be (and should be) addressed using the 
traditional due process methodology. The same goes for other Lochner-era cases, like Meyer and 
Pierce. 220 The abortion cases, though, are more debatable. Roe was decided on due process 
grounds, but many scholars have argued that it should have been decided on equal protection 
grounds, as a sex discrimination case.221 Seeing Roe as an antisubordination case might actually 
provide the legal basis for framing the right generally (as a right to privacy or bodily 
autonomy).222 But perhaps the most pressing question (which Chapter Four will tackle with 
 
220 It should be noted that the law at issue in Meyer, which banned the teaching of foreign languages in 
schools, was motivated by anti-German sentiment in the wake of World War I. See generally CHRISTOPHER 
CAPOZZOLA, UNCLE SAM WANTS YOU: WORLD WAR I AND THE MAKING OF THE AMERICAN CITIZEN 190-97 (2008). 
However, the law itself was facially neutral (banning the teaching of any foreign language) and was found to violate 
generally-applicable fundamental liberty interests (related to children’s education and upbringing more broadly). On 
the one hand, it seems reasonable that when a law violates a generally-applicable fundamental liberty, the Court 
should decide the case on solely Due Process grounds. However, one could also argue that, post-Glucksberg, a case 
like Meyer could have turned out quite differently. The Court in Meyer, after all, relied on very abstract fundamental 
liberties, which may not have been deemed “careful” enough definitions. If the right had instead been framed as a 
“right to teach foreign languages in public schools,” would it still be deemed fundamental? Perhaps Meyer would be 
viewed as an anti-subordination case today, and the equal dignity framework would give a justification for 
generalizing the right in question. See infra pp. 66-69. 
221 See e.g. TRIBE, supra note 15, at 1353-56; Catharine MacKinnon, Feminism Unmodified ch. 8 (Harvard, 
1987); Kenneth L. Karst, Foreword: Equal Citizenship Under the Fourteenth Amendment, 91 HARV. L. REV. 1, 53-
59 (1977); Frederick Schauer, Easy Cases, 58 S. CAL. L. REV. 399, 431-32 n. 83 (1985); Ruth Bader Ginsburg, 
Some Thoughts on Autonomy and Equality in Relation to Roe v Wade, 63 N.C. L. REV. 375 (1985). 
222 See infra pp. 66-69. 
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respect to physician-assisted suicide) is whether the doctrine of equal dignity should warrant 
reconsideration of any failed Fourteenth Amendment challenges.  
If Obergefell was not the last antisubordination case, then it is important to determine 
how the equal dignity approach differs from the traditional approach. Synthesizing the lessons of 
the gay rights cases, there are two major differences between the standard due process approach 
(aka the Glucksberg approach) and the dignity-based approach. 
Generalizing Upward 
The first methodological shift that equal dignity triggers involves the definition of the 
right in question. As demonstrated, this is a crucial step in the analysis.223 The Glucksberg 
approach requires a “careful definition” of the right in question. In normal substantive due 
process cases, this requirement is good and necessary; it keeps the Court’s analysis grounded in 
tradition and keeps the Due Process Clause from becoming a blank check. But in cases that 
involve subordination, specific framings of the asserted right will inevitably handicap minorities 
and prevent the Court from overturning deeply entrenched wrongs. In these cases, the Court must 
eschew the requirement for a careful definition and instead generalize upward. 
This exercise in generalization, however, is neither unguided nor unbounded. The Court’s 
apprehension of broadly-defined rights is prudent, and Kennedy understood that. His approach to 
defining rights in the equal dignity cases reveals the guiding principles the Court should follow 
going forward. The Court must be careful to generalize in the right direction and to the right 
extent.  
First, the Court must generalize in the right direction. As Tribe points out, generalization 
is not a one-dimensional exercise—moving left and right on a single line, from specific to 
 
223 See supra notes 87-88 and accompanying text. 
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increasingly general.224 A right can be narrow in one dimension, while broad in another. 
Consequently, one can theoretically generalize across any of those dimensions. Think back to the 
case of Michael H. v. Gerald D., where Justice Scalia argued that rights should be defined at the 
most specific level possible. There, he chose to define the asserted rights as “the rights of the 
natural father of a child adulterously conceived,” but noted that if it were not possible to use that 
framing, then the Court “would have to consult, and (if possible) reason from, the traditions 
regarding natural fathers in general.”225 The problem is, that is only one of multiple possible 
abstractions.226 When abstracting from Scalia’s narrowly-defined right, one could easily abstract 
out either 1) the sex of Michael H., 2) the adultery (as Scalia did), or 3) the presence of Gerald 
D. (See Figure 1 below.) 
Figure 1 – Generalizing Across Different Dimensions 
 
These rights are all more general than the initial right, but they generalize away different aspects. 
Simply asserting that the Court should “generalize upward” does not answer in which direction 
to generalize. This is the first challenge to overcome. 
 
224 Tribe & Dorf, supra note 87, at 1077 (noting that “[a] right may be broad along one dimension, while 
narrow along another.”) 
225 Michael H. v. Gerald D, 491 U.S. 110 (1989) at 128 n. 6.  
226 Tribe & Dorf, supra note 87, at 1077. 
“the rights of the natural father of a 
child adulterously conceived” 
“the rights of the parent of a 
child adulterously conceived” 




Second, the Court must make sure not to go too far in its generalization. Doing so causes 
the inquiry to become inaccessibly abstract and cloaks tangible actions in lofty principles. The 
Court recognizes this danger. For this reason, while the Court often cites the general principles 
of dignity and autonomy in substantive due process cases, they have stopped short of 
establishing a “fundamental right to autonomy.”227 After all, what would such a right protect? 
Laws, by their very nature, limit autonomy. Establishing a right so broad unhinges the inquiry 
from tradition and puts the Court in the position of determining what deprivations of autonomy 
are tolerable. For this reason, the Court must ensure that it does not generalize too far, even in 
cases involving equal dignity.  
Three guiding principles will help the Court generalize in the right direction and to the 
right extent. First, the Court must use precedent as its guide. When considering possible 
generalizations, the Court should keep its existing due process precedents top of mind. This is 
seen most clearly in Obergefell, where the Court referenced the “right to marry.”228 This right 
was firmly grounded in precedent, which the Court made sure to point out.229 When a higher-
level right has already been recognized by the Court, that provides a strong basis for choosing it 
as the appropriate generalization. 
Second, the Court should only accept generalizations that have accessible tradition. This 
requirement was one aspect of Justice Scalia’s Michael H. rights-definition methodology, and for 
 
227 See, e.g., Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 846 (1992) (affirming a 
woman’s right to an abortion); Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 279 (assuming the existence of a “right to refuse lifesaving 
hydration and nutrition”); Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 574 (2003) (referencing “autonomy” but declining to 
identify a “right to autonomy”).  
228 Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2598 (2015). 
229 Id. at 2602 (referencing Loving, Turner, and Zablocki). 
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good reason.230 In the next step of the inquiry, the Court must analyze history and tradition, so 
there needs to be some tradition available to analyze. Scalia was concerned that overly-specific 
rights (like “the right for two 35-year-old women in New York to get married”) are impossible to 
analyze historically. But actually, this is true at both ends of the spectrum. It is also impossible to 
find tradition when rights are defined too broadly. Consider a Court trying to find a historical 
basis for a “right to autonomy.” Any tradition the Court could find in favor (or against) such a 
right would be far more specific than the asserted right; this is a red flag that the right is defined 
too broadly.  
Finally, the Court should prioritize removing the minority group’s identity from the 
framing of the right. This will prevent the historical subordination from dominating the tradition 
analysis. This is precisely what the Court did in Obergefell (and, less explicitly, in Lawrence). 
Instead of choosing a “right to same-sex marriage,” the Court generalized to a “right to 
marry.”231 Accordingly in Lawrence, while the Court avoided any specific naming of the right, 
they refocused the analysis from a “right to homosexual sodomy” to more basic principles of 
autonomy in choices of sexual intimacy.232 The core principle behind the generalization should 
be removing the minority group’s identity from the right in question. In some cases, this may be 
the only generalization necessary. 
A New Role for History and Tradition 
The second methodological shift triggered by equal dignity involves the use of history 
and tradition. Because the asserted right has been generalized, the standard framework is not 
 
230 See Michael H., 491 U.S. at 128 n. 6. 
231 See Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2602. 
232 See Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 566-67. 
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probing enough. Simply establishing that a general right is fundamental is not enough to 
determine that the group in question should have access to the general right. Some deprivations 
may be for legitimate reasons, and the Court’s analysis needs to leave room for that possibility. 
The solution is to use a three-step framework, modeled after Justice Kennedy’s approach in 
Obergefell.233 
First, the Court should ask if the asserted right is fundamental. This is the same analysis 
demanded by Glucksberg. The Court should follow its standard process for determining if rights 
are fundamental—analyzing whether the asserted right is “deeply rooted in this Nation’s history 
and tradition” and “implicit in the concept of ordered liberty.”234 It is important to note, though, 
that this will be an easier bar to clear because the right is defined more abstractly.235 In fact, in 
some cases (like Glucksberg) this first question will already be answered by precedent. The 
“right to marry” was already firmly established as a fundamental right by a number of the 
Court’s prior decisions.236 This allowed the Court in Obergefell to skip over this first step of the 
analysis entirely.237  
Second, the Court should ask why the asserted right is fundamental. In equal dignity 
cases, the Court must dig deeper—to determine the specific reasons a right is fundamental (if it 
is). The Court did this explicitly in Obergefell, identifying “four principles and traditions” that 
 
233 See Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2599. 
234 See supra pp. 30-31. 
235 See supra note 87 and accompanying text. 
236 See, e.g., Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967); Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78 (1987); Zablocki v. 
Redhail, 434 U.S. 374 (1978). 
237 See Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2598 (“Over time and in other contexts, the Court has reiterated that the 
right to marry is fundamental under the Due Process Clause.”). 
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form the basis for marriage’s status as a fundamental right.238 (One, for example, was that 
“marriage is a keystone of our social order.”239) This second step leads directly into the third. 
Finally, the Court should ask whether the reasons the asserted right is fundamental justify 
excluding the group in question from enjoying it. This was the test that the Court used in 
Obergefell,240 and it makes sense why. Sometimes, deprivations may be reasonable—and related 
to the core principles behind the right itself. But if the reasons why the right is fundamental 
“apply with equal force” to the minority in question, there can be no reason to exclude them from 
its protection.  
This step of the analysis could also provide a response to a slippery-slope argument 
raised in the Chief Justice Roberts’s dissent. The Chief Justice asked why the two-person 
element of marriage should endure if the man-woman element should not.241 Several of the 
majority’s “principles and traditions,” though, could provide a basis for excluding polygamous 
unions from the right to marry—one of which is that marriage “supports a two-person union 
unlike any other in its importance to the committed individuals”242 and another of which is that 
marriage “safeguards children and families.”243 Even the tradition that marriage is central to our 
social order could provide a reason to exclude polygamous unions. This step of the analysis pits 
historical traditions regarding general rights against historical deprivations from minority 
 
238 See id. at 2599. 
239 Id. at 2601. 
240 See id. at 2599 (“[Our] analysis compels the conclusion that same-sex couples may exercise the right to 
marry. The four principles and traditions [identified] demonstrate that the reasons marriage is fundamental under the 
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241 See id. at 2621 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting). 
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groups—to determine whether the deprivation is justified or whether it is simply baseless 
subordination. 
In equal dignity cases, this three step process244 should replace the traditional tiers of 
scrutiny framework. The gay rights cases were each ambiguous about what standard of review 
they employed, and it is difficult to see this omission as anything but intentional. The rigid tiers 
of scrutiny approach has been the subject of sharp criticism by both members of the Court245 and 
legal academics.246 Justice Kennedy knew what it would mean to name a clear standard of 
scrutiny in each case, and he knew what it would mean to decline to do so. He (and thus, the 
Court) declined to do so. The rigid tiers of scrutiny approach still has a place, but that place is 
not in equal dignity cases. 
These variations on the traditional substantive due process framework are necessary 
when subordination is afoot. The standard due process and equal protection frameworks are 
inadequate to remedy long-entrenched deprivations of fundamental liberties. Justice Kennedy 
recognized this, and his equal dignity framework operates at the intersection of the Due Process 
 
244 1) Is the asserted right fundamental? 2) If so, what are the reasons it is fundamental? 3) Do the reasons 
the asserted right is fundamental justify excluding the group in question from enjoying it?  
245 See, e.g., Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 211-12 (1976) (Stevens, J., concurring) (arguing that “[t]here is 
only one Equal Protection Clause,” and that “[i]t does not direct the courts to apply one standard of review in some 
cases and a different standard in other cases”); San Antonio School District v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 93 (1973) 
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such discrimination—whatever the standard of equal protection analysis employed.”) 
246 See, e.g., Tribe, supra note 85, at 1916 (noting that the tiered scrutiny approach “is of relatively recent 
vintage, is often more conclusory than informative, has frequently been subjected to cogent criticism, and has not 
shown itself worthy of being enshrined as a permanent fixture in the armament of constitutional analysis”); Reva 
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an alternative standard for review). 
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Chapter Four: Where Equal Dignity Leads 
If the Court adopts the notion of equal dignity described in the last chapter, then the 
doctrine’s scope cannot be limited to issues of gay rights. To start, a single, interwoven guarantee 
of liberty and equality could provide a clearer path forward for similarly-situated plaintiffs, like 
those seeking recognition of transgender rights. But its reach could be even farther—to cases and 
issues quite different on their face from those presented in Lawrence and Obergefell. It could 
even provide the basis for the Court to reconsider prior rulings which have been eroded by the 
equal dignity cases. 
The clearest example of such a case is Glucksberg. A constellation of different factors 
point to the Court’s 1997 decision as a prime candidate for reconsideration. For one, Glucksberg 
was explicitly singled out in Obergefell—where the majority wrote that the Court’s approach in 
Glucksberg only “may have” been appropriate.247 Yoshino reasoned that this qualified language 
was likely the Court “taking the familiar step of isolating a precedent before overruling it 
altogether.”248 Although I have argued that there is still a place in Fourteenth Amendment 
jurisprudence for the Glucksberg approach,249 that does not mean that Glucksberg was the place 
for the Glucksberg approach.  
In fact, there are reasons to believe that Glucksberg should have been viewed as an equal 
dignity case. Notably, it was one of two cases regarding physician-assisted suicide that the Court 
decided simultaneously in 1997; the other was Vacco v. Quill. While Glucksberg considered 
 
247 Id. at 2602. See also id. at 2620 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (“[T]he majority’s position requires it to 
effectively overrule Glucksberg”). 
248 Yoshino, supra note 81, at 165.  
249 Namely, when there are not subordination concerns and only the Due Process Clause is implicated. 
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whether laws banning assisted-suicide violated the Due Process Clause, Quill considered 
whether identical laws in New York violated the Equal Protection Clause.250 Could physician-
assisted suicide fall into that same blind spot that Lawrence and Obergefell were situated in—
where only a synthesized notion of the two clauses can adequately remedy the harm? 
Aditionally, the precedential weight of Glucksberg and Quill—even apart from 
intervening cases—is likely not as substantial as it might appear at first glance. Although both 
cases were decided by unanimous decision, a closer look at the opinions shows that many of the 
most important questions were left unanswered. A number of justices wrote separately to note 
that they were only deciding that the laws were not facially unconstitutional (i.e. unconstitutional 
in all applications)—leaving future Courts to decide whether the laws were unconstitutional as-
applied (to the class of terminally ill, mentally competent patients).251  
All these considerations suggest that, if the Court faced the issue of physician-assisted 
suicide again, the doctrine of equal dignity could entail a very different sort of analysis—and 
potentially, a different outcome. In this chapter, I will consider whether Glucksberg should be 
overruled in light of intervening precedent, by answering two questions. First, is Glucksberg an 
equal dignity case? And second, if so, does applying the doctrine of equal dignity result in a 
different outcome? 
Physician-Assisted Suicide as an Issue of Equality 
To determine whether physician-assisted suicide should be analyzed as an equal dignity 
case, one must first understand the issues of fairness present in end-of-life scenarios, which were 
 
250 Vacco v. Quill, 521 U.S. 793, 797 (1997). 
251 See, e.g., id. at 809 (O’Connor, J., concurring); id. at 809-10 (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgments); 
id. at 750 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in the judgments). 
76 
 
considered by the Court in Glucksberg’s sister case, Vacco v. Quill. Just seven years earlier, in 
Cruzan, the Court had recognized a right to refuse life-sustaining treatment.252 However, in most 
states, it was still a crime to assist suicide, which includes physicians prescribing lethal doses.253 
The Second Circuit determined that these two conflicting realities were unjustifiable 
under the Equal Protection Clause. The easiest way to see the inequity is via a hypothetical.254 
Consider two married couples, driving together in a car. Another car runs a red light and hits 
them, leaving all four passengers in critical condition. At the hospital, Husband A elects to have 
a feeding tube implanted, since his injuries have made it very painful for him to eat normally. 
Husband B does not need a feeding tube, but he takes serious pain medication to mitigate his 
extreme pain. The next morning, the two husbands each learn two things. Overnight, both of 
their wives have passed away; on top of that, they are both terminally ill with no chance of 
recovery. Husband A decides he no longer wants to live any longer and, rather than dying 
painfully over a matter of weeks, asks that the feeding tube be removed—which he knows will 
quickly result in his death. This choice is protected by his right to refuse medical treatment. 
Husband B makes the same decision, that he does not want to live any longer, but he does not 
have a machine with a switch that can be flipped. New York law prohibits his doctor from 
prescribing lethal medication, so Husband B is forced to live out his final, painful weeks. 
The Second Circuit ruled that there was no rational basis for drawing this distinction255—
allowing Husband A to ask his physician to take an action that he knew would end his life, but 
 
252 See Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 278. 
253 See Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 725 (1997). 
254 The hypothetical that follows borrows some aspects from various situations described by Laurence Tribe 
at oral argument in Quill. 
255 Quill v. Vacco, 80 F.3d 716 (2d Cir. 1996). 
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not allowing Husband B to do the same. In doing so, they rejected multiple alleged reasons for 
drawing a distinction between the two cases. In response to the assertion that removing life-
support systems was merely “allowing nature to take its course,”256 the Second Circuit responded 
that 
there is nothing “natural” about causing death by means other than the original illness or 
its complications. The withdrawal of nutrition brings on death by starvation, the 
withdrawal of hydration brings on death by dehydration, and withdrawal of ventilation 
brings about respiratory failure. … It certainly cannot be said that the death that 
immediately ensues is the natural result of the progression of the disease or the condition 
from which the patient suffers.257 
In other words, dying from the removal of life-sustaining treatment is just as unnatural as dying 
from taking lethal medication. In both cases, the reason for death is separate from the underlying 
terminal illness. The Second Circuit also rejected the action/inaction distinction (i.e. that 
removing life-sustaining treatment is “inaction” whereas taking lethal medication is “action”). To 
this claim, the Second Circuit wrote:  
[T]he writing of a prescription to hasten death involves a far less active role for the 
physician than is required in bringing about death through asphyxiation, starvation, 
and/or dehydration.258 
Having explained away these two supposed distinctions, the Second Circuit concluded that there 
was no principled basis for distinguishing between refusing life-sustaining treatment and 
requesting life-ending medication. 
The Supreme Court, however, overruled the Second Circuit’s decision.259 Chief Justice 
Rehnquist wrote for the majority that “[t]he distinction comports with fundamental legal 
 
256 Quill v. Koppell, 870 F. Supp. 78, 84 (S.D.N.Y. 1994). 
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principles of causation and intent.”260 As for causation, he argued that when a patient refuses 
life-sustaining treatment, their subsequent death is caused by their underlying condition; when a 
patient ingests lethal medication, their death is caused by the medication. As for intent, the Chief 
Justice wrote that a doctor who removes life-sustaining treatment is primarily attempting to 
honor their patient’s wishes; a doctor who prescribes lethal medication primarily seeks to end 
their patient’s life.261 Since the case did not involve suspect classifications, the Court determined 
that these two justifications satisfied the rational basis level of scrutiny, and reversed the Second 
Circuit’s decision. 
Antisubordination and the Terminally Ill 
The contrasting decisions by the Second Circuit and the Supreme Court illustrate the 
difficulty in trying to justify a distinction between refusing life-sustaining treatment and 
requesting lethal medication. Notably, though, both decisions were based on a traditional, purely 
Equal Protection analysis. This meant that those challenging the law had to fight an extremely 
uphill battle—because the laws only had to satisfy rational basis scrutiny.262  
Glucksberg and Quill completely partitioned the Due Process and Equal Protection 
analyses. But, in light of the equal dignity cases, should they have? I have argued that cases that 
involve subordination—where a group is deprived of fundamental rights that are generally 
granted to those outside the group—demand a different analytical framework. Are Glucksberg 
and Quill, rightly viewed, subordination cases? 
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On the one hand, if banning physician-assisted suicide amounts to subordination, it would 
seem to be a somewhat different flavor of subordination than that present in the gay rights cases. 
Justice Kennedy spoke of the “stigma” that those laws created—the message to children of gay 
parents that their families were somehow “lesser.”263 Do laws banning assisted suicide really 
impose stigma, similar in any meaningful way to the stigma imposed by laws banning 
homosexual intimacy? 
If one takes a step back, similarities start to emerge. Subordination occurs when the law 
does not afford a particular group the same fundamental freedom that it gives to those similarly 
situated to them. Such legislation has a clear message—that members of that group are not 
entitled to the same autonomy as their fellow man. This demeaning message constitutes an 
independent harm that can sometimes outweigh the harm of the deprivation itself—in the same 
way that revoking privileges from an employee says less about the privilege and more about the 
employee.  
In this case, the group in question is the mentally incompetent, terminally ill—who do not 
have the ability to flip a switch or remove a medical mechanism to end their life. The freedom in 
question (which the next section will more carefully define) involves the liberty to choose to 
hasten their imminent death. This freedom is granted to those on life-support mechanisms, but 
not to other terminally ill patients. Think back to the hypothetical of the two husbands—one can 
see that laws banning assisted suicide also carry with them a demeaning message and 
stigmatizing effect. While the law permitted Husband A to say goodbye to his friends and family 
before asking his doctor to withdraw life support and end his life, it did not afford Husband B the 
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80 
 
same freedom. He was forced to live out his final days or weeks in uncertainty—sure of the 
imminent result but unsure how long or painful the time in between would be.  
The choices left to patients in this state are often few and bleak. Opioids may help to ease 
a patient’s severe pain, but at a certain point a person’s agony can become so extreme that 
opioids are no longer going to work.264 At this point, a person likely only has two options. Either 
live out one’s final days in excruciating pain—or resort to barbiturates or benzodiazepines to put 
the patient in a comatose state, where they will remain as they slowly die and their families see 
them gradually deteriorate.265 
In these cases, the law imposes a stigma on the patients that constitutes an independent 
harm, separate from the actual pain and suffering they are forced to endure. Although one may 
argue that laws do not stigmatize—people do—it is never that simple. Societal attitudes and laws 
are related in complex ways. Neither is wholly downstream from the other. Changing societal 
understandings can result in changed laws, but—as the gay rights cases indicate—changing laws 
can also hasten changes in societal attitudes. Laws have a way of confirming our priors; when 
they are struck down or repealed, it forces us to reexamine our (sometimes subconscious) beliefs 
about right and wrong, proper and improper, sacrilegious and sacred. When the law allows one 
terminally ill patient to end his life and forces another who would do the same to slowly 
deteriorate, that says something about the two men’s choices. One choice it valorizes, the other it 
calls “suicide.”  
When compared to another terminally ill patient—maybe just one hospital room over—
whose only meaningful difference is a tube that can be removed or a plug that can be pulled, 
 




patients not given the freedom to make this choice do seem to suffer a dignitary harm. While the 
law grants one terminally ill patient the right to die with dignity, it denies it to another. One 
patient is granted autonomy in his final days; the other is forced to choose between agony and 
unconsciousness. The final, lasting image of these two patients in the hearts and minds of their 
loved ones may—through no fault of their own—be quite different. While this subordination is 
concededly different than that of the gay rights cases, and here may even be justified—it is 
subordination nonetheless. Both liberty and equality are at stake. The equal dignity framework is 
the only suitable one to analyze laws banning assisted suicide. 
Defining the Right in Question 
Now, to apply that framework to the issue of physician-assisted suicide. The first step in 
the equal dignity approach, as in the traditional approach, is to define the right in question. 
Because of the equality concerns, though, the right should be generalized to better capture the 
fundamental liberty at stake.266 In Glucksberg, the Court defined the right as a “right to suicide” 
which included a right to assistance in doing so.267 Multiple justices took issue with this framing 
of the right at the time,268 however, and it is inappropriate in the equal dignity context for several 
reasons.  
 
266 See supra pp. 66-69. 
267 Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 723 (1997). 
268 See, e.g., Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 736 (1997) (O’Connor, J., concurring) (writing that 
the broad framing of the right is appropriate given the facial challenges to the laws at issue); id. at 750 (Stevens, J., 
concurring in the judgments) (arguing that “a more particularized challenge” could succeed in the future, with a 
different framing of the write); id. at 781 (Souter, J., concurring in the judgment) (contending that the respondents 
“base their claim on the traditional right to medical care and counsel”); id. at 790 (Breyer, J., concurring in the 
judgments) (noting that he “would not reject the respondents' claim without considering a different formulation, for 
which our legal tradition may provide greater support”). 
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For one, in Glucksberg, the Court viewed the challenge as facial. Because the law in 
question simply banned assisting another’s suicide, it made some sense to frame the right as the 
Court did. After all, the only way a law banning assisting suicide could be facially 
unconstitutional is if there were a fundamental right to have someone assist your suicide. But 
here, the challenge is as-applied—to the class of terminally ill, mentally competent patients. 
These patients are surely not asserting a broad “right to commit suicide.” Many of them may 
well have moral objections to suicide in other contexts; even those who do not still may object to 
a hypothetical “right to commit suicide.” No, this class of patients seeks something substantially 
different. They seek the same right that terminally ill patients who are on life-support are 
granted. 
But what exactly is the right that this class of patients would assert? In Cruzan, the right 
the Court recognized was narrow: “the right of a competent individual to refuse medical 
treatment.”269 That narrow framing, obviously, is not any help to patients who wish to hasten 
their imminent death but do not have life-sustaining treatment to refuse. By generalizing, 
however, one can arrive at a broader “right”270 which these patients are asserting. In his 
concurrence, Justice Breyer, musing over the potential for a future as-applied challenge, traced 
the outlines of what such a right might look like: 
I would not reject the respondents’ claim without considering a different formulation, for 
which our legal tradition might provide greater support. That formulation would use 
words roughly like a “right to die with dignity.” But irrespective of the exact words used, 
at its core would lie personal control over the manner of death, professional medical 
 
269 Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 277. 
270 NB: We have not yet established that our alleged “right” is an actual right at all—much less a 
fundamental right. Hence the quotation marks. 
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assistance, and the avoidance of unnecessary and severe physical suffering—
combined.271 
In this passage, Justice Breyer gets at the core of the right that such patients would really be 
seeking. The formulation of a “right to die with dignity” is apt. There is dignity in having 
autonomy over one’s final days. This formulation (along with the detail added by Justice Breyer) 
gets at the core of what is being denied to terminally ill patients who are not on life support. 
This framing of the right raises a point discussed earlier.272 Rights are multi-dimensional. 
Hence, they can be broad in one respect and narrow in another. Defining the asserted right as a 
“right to die with dignity” is one example of this reality; in some senses, this framing is actually 
narrower than a “right to suicide,” although in other senses it is broader.273 This is instructive to 
the rights-definition exercise. Although it will generally be appropriate to perform some amount 
of generalization in equal dignity cases, it is also important to frame the right correctly. This may 
actually require being specific in certain ways. For example, here, the fact that the patients 
raising the claim are terminally ill is central to their asserted right. Including this feature in the 
framing of the right will, indeed, make the right more specific. But it must be included to capture 
the freedom they seek. In certain cases, like this one, generalizing the right in certain ways (e.g. 
as a “right to commit suicide”) can turn out to be just as misguided as framing it specifically. 
Is the “Right to Die with Dignity” Fundamental? 
After defining the right—in this case, as a “right to die with dignity”—the next step is to 
determine whether that right is a fundamental liberty interest. The Court should consider, like in 
 
271 Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 790 (Breyer, J., concurring in the judgments). 
272 See supra note 224 and accompanying text. 
273 For example, a “right to suicide” would also apply to depressed, otherwise healthy 20-year-olds. A 
“right to die with dignity” would not. But on the other hand, the former right would not apply to those on death row 
who wish to have some say in their method of execution. The latter right well could.  
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standard Due Process cases, whether the right is “implicit in the concept of ordered liberty” and 
“deeply rooted” in our country’s history. Four interlocking principles, grounded in tradition and 
precedent, indicate that such a right is fundamental. 
First, a right to die with dignity comports with other fundamental liberty interests rooted 
in bodily autonomy. The Court’s clearest statement of this aspect of liberty came in Casey. 
There, Justice Kennedy pointed out that abortion rights have “doctrinal affinity to cases 
recognizing limits on governmental power to mandate medical treatment or bar its rejection.”274 
The common thread, according to Kennedy, is the notion of “personal autonomy and bodily 
integrity.”275 
A right to die with dignity—whether applied to patients hooked up to respirators or those 
who are not—is an exercise of bodily autonomy. While perhaps not all medical choices are of 
fundamental importance, some unquestionably are. As Justice Kennedy famously wrote: 
[Matters] involving the most intimate and personal choices a person may make in a 
lifetime, choices central to personal dignity and autonomy, are central to the liberty 
protected by the Fourteenth Amendment. At the heart of liberty is the right to define 
one’s own concept of existence, of meaning, of the universe, and of the mystery of 
human life. Beliefs about these matters could not define the attributes of personhood were 
they formed under compulsion of the State.276 
When terminally ill patients make decisions about their medical care in their final days, those 
decisions are undeniably “choices central to personal dignity and autonomy.” Such choices, the 
Court has ruled, “are central to the liberty protected by the Fourteenth Amendment.” This is the 
first principle indicating that a right to die with dignity is fundamental. 
 
274 Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 857 (1992). 
275 Id. 
276 Id. at 851. 
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Second, the right to die with dignity is an expression of a person’s interest in avoiding 
pain in his final moments. This principle relates to a point that multiple justices touched on in 
their Glucksberg concurrences. Even in states that ban physician-assisted suicide, patients can 
still “obtain palliative care, even when doing so would hasten their deaths.”277 In other words, 
doctors are permitted to prescribe medication that hastens a patient’s death—so long as the 
primary intent of the prescription is to limit pain. The American Medical Association even 
“unequivocally endorses” this practice, to protect patients from excruciating pain.278 Although it 
may seem difficult to draw a meaningful moral distinction between prescribing dosages of pain 
medication high enough to hasten a patient’s time of death (i.e. the legal practice of terminal 
sedation) and prescribing medication specifically designed to achieve that same result (i.e. the 
typically-illegal practice of physician-assisted suicide), some argue that there is a very important 
one—the principle of double effect.279 Essentially, the double effect doctrine sets forth specific 
conditions under which a person may morally commit an action from which two effects will 
follow—one good and one bad.280 Taking actions that produce bad effects can be morally 
permissible, so long as one does not intend those effects (even if one foresees them). This 
arguably justifies the use of extreme dosages of pain medication. The doctor, arguably, is acting 
with the intent of diminishing pain (the good effect)—even though he knows that his action will 
 
277 Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 738 (1997) (O’Connor, J., concurring). 
278 Id. at 751 (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgments). 
279 See, e.g., NEIL M. GORSUCH, THE FUTURE OF ASSISTED SUICIDE AND EUTHANASIA § 4.3 (2006). But see 
Timothy E. Quill et al., The Rule of Double Effect — A Critique of Its Role in End-of-Life Decision Making, 337 
NEW ENG. J. MED. 1768 (1997). 
280 See GORSUCH, supra note 279, at 54. 
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also hasten the patient’s death (the bad effect). Whereas a doctor who prescribes lethal 
medication must, first and foremost, intend to hasten their patient’s death. 
The doctrine sets forth multiple conditions which must be met for an act to be morally 
permissible—one of which is that the good effect must be at least as important as the bad effect 
(to compensate for causing the bad effect).281 The logical consequence of this argument (which is 
arguably accepted by all 50 states, since terminal sedation is legal in every state)282 is that the 
elimination of pain is of at least equal importance as the hastening of death. Otherwise, the 
doctrine of double effect would not permit the practice, since the bad effect would outweigh the 
good. This reality underscores a more basic one—the prevention of severe pain at the end of life 
is incredibly important, and universally respected by state law.283 
Another, disparate area of law further demonstrates the fundamental nature of the pain-
avoidance principle. The Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause, while it does not guarantee a 
painless death for death row inmates, does provide certain rights for death row inmates to choose 
less painful methods if they are available. Under the Baze-Glossip test, an inmate has the right to 
choose an alternative method of execution if it substantially reduces the risk of severe pain (and 
if two other conditions are met).284 Although this right is not based in the Fourteenth 
Amendment, it points to the deep importance ascribed to the prevention of severe pain in one’s 
final moments. 
 
281 4 THE CATHOLIC UNIVERSITY OF AMERICA, NEW CATHOLIC ENCYCLOPEDIA 880 (2d ed. 2002). 
282 Michael Ollove, Palliative Sedation, an End-of-Life Practice That is Legal Everywhere, STATELINE 
(July 2, 2018), https://www.pewtrusts.org/en/research-and-analysis/blogs/stateline/2018/07/02/palliative-sedation-
an-endoflife-practice-that-is-legal-everywhere. 
283 “Universally respected,” because every state allows this practice. 
284 See Bucklew v. Precythe, 139 S. Ct. 1112, 1121 (2019). 
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Third, the right to die with dignity is an outgrowth of the doctor-patient relationship, a 
dignified zone of decision-making. This principle also traces back to the Court’s abortion rights 
precedents, but more pertinently to Roe than Casey. While Casey focused on abortion as an 
exercise of a woman’s right to bodily autonomy, Roe had emphasized the role of the physician: 
[Our] decision vindicates the right of the physician to administer treatment according to 
his professional judgment up to the points where important state interests provide 
compelling justifications for intervention. Up to those points, the abortion decision in all 
its aspects is inherently, and primarily, a medical decision, and basic responsibility for it 
must rest with the physician.285 
Although this aspect was downplayed in Casey, it remains good precedent—and supports the 
notion that the doctor-patient relationship represents an important decision-making nexus. 
Insofar as a mentally competent patient comes to care decisions with the counsel of their 
physician, there are important privacy concerns in coming to those decisions without state 
intervention. Roe validates those concerns. The right to die with dignity, likewise, draws 
meaning from them.  
Fourth and finally, the right to die with dignity represents a patient’s basic interest in 
controlling the manner of their imminent death. This principle draws on multiple sources already 
mentioned. The decision of how to face one’s imminent death must be encompassed by what 
Justice Kennedy referred to as “the right to define one’s own concept of existence, of meaning, 
of the universe, and of the mystery of human life.”286 One could argue—it fits that description 
even more obviously than the decision of whether or not to terminate a pregnancy. The Cruzan 
decision, of course, also supports this principle, as does the right of a prisoner on death row to 
choose her own method of execution. 
 
285 Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 165-66 (1973). 
286 Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 851 (1992). 
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But perhaps most salient to this principle is not Supreme Court precedent—but state 
recognition. In 1994, Oregon became the first state to legalize physician-assisted suicide, with 
the passage of its Death with Dignity Act after a ballot initiative.287 Although Oregon remained 
alone in legalization for nearly fifteen years, the last fifteen years have seen a wave of states join 
Oregon. Next came Washington in 2008.288 Followed by Montana289 (2009), Vermont290 (2013), 
California291 (2015), Colorado292 (2016), Washington D.C.293 (2016), Hawaii294 (2018), Maine295 
(2019), and New Jersey296 (2019). But what should be the Court’s takeaway from this wave of 
state legalization? On the one hand, the Court might point to it as evidence that the legislative 
process is working exactly as it should! The Court ended its opinion in Glucksberg by writing: 
 
287 See Timothy Egan, Assisted Suicide Comes Full Circle, to Oregon, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 26, 1997.  
288 See William Yardley, First Death for Washington Assisted-Suicide Law, N.Y. TIMES, May 22, 2009. 
289 See Baxter v. State, 354 Mont. 234 (Mont. 2009). This legalization came via a state supreme court 
decision—not legislatively. 
290 See Paris Achen, Permanent Version of Vt. Assisted Suicide Bill Signed, USA TODAY (May 20, 2015, 
6:30 PM), https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2015/05/20/permanent-version-of-vt-assisted-suicide-bill-
signed/27675289/. 
291 See Lisa Aliferis, California to Permit Medically Assisted Suicide as of June 9, NPR (March 10, 2016, 
6:58 PM), https://www.npr.org/sections/health-shots/2016/03/10/469970753/californias-law-on-medically-assisted-
suicide-to-take-effect-june-9. 
292 See Paula Span, A Deliberate End, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 17, 2017, at A1. 
293 See Fenit Nirappil, A Year After D.C. Passed its Controversial Assisted Suicide Law, Not a Single 
Patient Has Used It, WASH. POST (Apr. 10, 2018, 12:15 PM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/dc-politics/a-
year-after-dc-passed-its-assisted-suicide-law-only-two-doctors-have-signed-up/2018/04/10/823cf7e2-39ca-11e8-
9c0a-85d477d9a226_story.html. 
294 See Sophia Yan, Medically Assisted Suicide Becomes Legal in Hawaii, U.S. News (Apr. 15, 2018), 
https://www.usnews.com/news/news/articles/2018-04-05/hawaii-legalizes-medically-assisted-suicide. 
295 See Paula Span, Making the Ultimate Decision, N.Y. TIMES, July 9, 2019, at D1. 
296 See id.  
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Throughout the Nation, Americans are engaged in an earnest and profound debate about 
the morality, legality, and practicality of physician-assisted suicide. Our holding permits 
this debate to continue, as it should in a democratic society.297 
Perhaps this remark was prescient—and now more than ever, the Court should leave the issue in 
the public forum where it belongs. 
But on the other hand, this was also the case in Obergefell—where many states were in 
the process of taking legislative action to legalize gay marriage, and several already had. But 
there, the Court decided to rule anyways, at the behest of the dissenting justices.298 In fact, the 
Court’s opinion indicated that it was not ruling in spite of the legislative movement; the 
legislative action was further proof that it was time for the Court to recognize a right to gay 
marriage. Justice Kennedy wrote that “in interpreting the Equal Protection Clause, the Court has 
recognized that new insights and societal understandings can reveal unjustified inequality within 
our most fundamental institutions that once passed unnoticed and unchallenged.”299 In an equal 
dignity context, legislative momentum must take on a different significance. When states begin 
to grant groups fundamental rights that were once denied, the Court’s response cannot be: let’s 
let this play out. If fundamental liberties are truly at stake, then the country’s “emerging 
recognition”300 of deep inequity should only further drive the Court to declare it so. While many 
issues ought to be left to the state legislatures, the recognition of fundamental rights is not among 
 
297 Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 735 (1997). 
298 See, e.g., Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2615 (2015) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (noting the 
legislative momentum of gay marriage and arguing that the decision should be left “in the hands of state voters”); id. 
at 2627 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“Until the courts put a stop to it, public debate over same-sex marriage displayed 
American democracy at its best.”); id. at 2637 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (“The majority apparently disregards the 
political process as a protection for liberty.”); id. at 2640 (Alito, J., diseenting) (“Until the federal courts intervened, 
the American people were engaged in a debate about whether their States should recognize same-sex marriage. … 
The Constitution leaves that question to be decided by the people of each State.”). 
299 Id. at 2603 (majority opinion). 
300 Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 572 (2003). 
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them. States removing bans on physician-assisted suicide should provide the Court with further 
evidence of the fundamental importance of a right to die with dignity. 
These four principles come together to establish why the right to die with dignity is 
fundamental. Examining each principle in turn shows—just as was the case in Obergefell—that 
these four principles “apply with equal force” to terminally ill patients who are not on life 
support. 1) Requesting lethal medication to hasten one’s imminent death is an exercise of 
personal autonomy and bodily integrity. 2) It gives a person the opportunity to avoid pain in his 
final moments. 3) It is the outcome of the end-of-life decision-making process between a doctor 
and her patient. 4) It gives the dying person control over the manner of his death. The reasons the 
right is fundamental give no reason to exclude terminally ill, mentally competent patients. These 






In many ways, the doctrine of equal dignity is the defining mark of the Court over the 
past twenty years. It is at the heart of its most high-profile cases. But the future of the doctrine is 
incredibly uncertain. Its primary author, Justice Kennedy, no longer sits on the Court. Now its 
future lies in the hands of a Court whose conservative majority never embraced the concept to 
begin with—and who perhaps now hold the power to render it obsolete. 
The Court would do well, though, to see the doctrine of equal dignity for what it is, and 
continue to employ it as such. Dignity is not a standalone, catch-all, unenumerated right—a 
blank check to an activist Court. Instead, it is a recognition that the Court’s traditional Due 
Process and Equal Protection frameworks have a blind spot at their intersection. Neither can 
adequately remedy baseless subordination.  
I have argued in this thesis that laws banning physician-assisted suicide for the terminally 
ill constitute one such form of subordination. Although the Court’s recent substantive due 
process precedents have signaled a willingness to depart from—and perhaps even overrule—
Glucksberg, the new makeup of the Court might mean otherwise. If the doctrine of equal dignity 
is to follow the logical trajectory set for it in the gay rights cases, however, then Glucksberg 
should be overturned. 
Substantive due process can invoke fear in those who dread “judicial activism” and the 
prospect of a Court untethered to the actual words in the Constitution, and there may be a 
tendency to react similarly to a notion of equal dignity. The Court should resist this temptation. 
Rightly understood, the doctrine of equal dignity can clarify the boundaries of due process 
inquiries. When only the Due Process Clause is implicated in a case, the Court should utilize the 
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standard framework laid out in Glucksberg, along with its rigid requirements. This approach 
keeps the requisite analysis grounded in history and tradition, rather than in abstract philosophy 
or the policy preferences of the members of the Court.  
But when liberty and equality are both at stake—in cases involving subordination—the 
standard frameworks are an insufficient remedy. Although judicially-invented frameworks may 
not provide an adequate remedy, the Constitution promises one. The Due Process and Equal 
Protection clauses guarantee liberty and equality. Where these two guarantees meet, the 
Constitution promises equal dignity. Justice Kennedy, perhaps more than anyone else, 
recognized this, and beneath the soaring rhetoric in his majority opinions lies a comprehensive 
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